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ABSTRACT
This Article presents an analysis and defense of the Supreme Court's current Eighth 
Amendment case law on prison sentencing.  I argue that in the pivotal cases of Ewing v. 
California and Harmelin v. Michigan, a plurality of the Supreme Court has assimilated 
Eighth Amendment review of individual prison sentences to rationality review of state 
action under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause.  When the cases are read 
rightly, it becomes clear that Eighth Amendment review does not really ask whether a 
sentence is "grossly disproportionate," as the Court has asserted; rather, it seeks to 
identify arbitrary and capricious prison sentences that suggest a procedural defect in the 
sentencing process.  I defend this doctrine on the grounds of original understanding, stare 
decisis, neutral interpretation, and normative federalism values.  Finally, I show how an 
interpretation of Eighth Amendment prison sentencing review as rationality review can 
be squared with the Supreme Court's decisions involving constitutional proportionality 
review of other noncapital sanctions such as fines, punitive damages, and conditions of 
confinement.
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It is a rational continuum which . . . includes a freedom from all substantial 
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints . . . .1
We have taken special care of you . . . .2
INTRODUCTION
Even by the standards of a contentious age, the Supreme Court has had a difficult 
time applying the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment3
coherently to sentences of imprisonment. Ever since the Lochner-era Court first 
determined that the Eighth Amendment limited not only the forms of punishment that 
legislatures could employ, but also the magnitude of punishments,4 a majority of the
Court has consistently asserted at least a residual power of judicial review in the area.  
The standard of review, however, has fluctuated.5 At one point the Court adopted 
a standard so deferential that it seemed to permit virtually any sentence to stand as long 
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 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1960) (Harlan, J. dissenting).
2
 Second Trial of Titus Oates, 10 Howell's State Trials 1227, 1314 (K.B. 1685) (remark of Justice Withins 
of King's Bench in passing sentence on Oates).
3 U.S. CONST., amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
4
 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
5 See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003) (“Our cases exhibit a lack of clarity regarding what 
factors may indicate gross disproportionality”); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 984, 998 (plurality 
opinion) (acknowledging that “[o]ur … recent pronouncement on the subject in Solem [v. Helm] … 
appeared to apply a different analysis than” other noncapital Eighth Amendment cases).  
3as the triggering crime was “classifiable as a felony.”6 Less than two years later, the
Court boldly proclaimed that prison terms “must be proportionate to the crime for which 
the defendant has been convicted,” and claimed the power to strike down “significantly 
dispropo rtionate” sentences.7 And today, the pendulum has swung back: the Court’s 
controlling opinions in Harmelin v. Michigan8 and the recent controversial decision in 
Ewing v. California9 conclude that the Eighth Amendment contains only a “narrow 
proportionality principle”10 that requires courts to strike down “extreme” prison terms 
“grossly disproportionate” to the crime.11 Justices Kennedy and O’Connor have authored 
the key plurality opinions setting out this standard.
If the opinions are chaotic, the Court’s holdings have been more coherent.  They 
reflect a deeply deferential approach to noncapital Eighth Amendment review. The Court 
has repeatedly upheld life sentences (including those without parole) that were triggered 
by minor or moderate crimes such as petty theft and first-time drug possession. The only 
discontinuity in the sequence of tough holdings is Solem v. Helm, which struck down a 
life sentence without parole imposed on a felony recidivist who obtained $100 by false 
pretenses.12
6
 Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 373 (1982) (per curiam).
7
 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290, 303 (1983).
8
 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
9
 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
10
 Ewing v. California, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 1185 (2003) (plurality opinion); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. at 
997 (plurality opinion).
11 Andrade, 538 U.S. at 73; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 997.
12
 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
4Neither the legal left nor the right is satisfied with this state of affairs.  The
Court’s willingness to affirm stringent sentences has produced dissatisfaction among 
academic commentators,13 lower court judges,14 dissenting Justices,15 and even some 
Justices who have concurred in the Court’s holdings.16 Moreover, the Court’s decisions 
arguably threaten to conflict with a fundamental norm of constitutional judging.  If a 
general principle forbidding excessive punishment is important enough to be embedded 
13 See, e.g., James J. Brennan, Note, The Supreme Court's Excessive Deference to Legislative Bodies Under 
Eighth Amendment Sentencing Review, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 551, 552 (2004) (criticizing Ewing
and calling on Supreme Court to "assert a more active role" in reviewing prison sentences); Rachel A. Van 
Cleave, "Death is Different," Is Money Different? Criminal Punishments, Forfeitures, and Punitive 
Damages – Shifting Constitutional Paradigms for Assessing Proportionality, 12 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J.
217, 219-20 (2003) (Supreme Court "gives teeth" to review of monetary deprivations in punitive damages 
cases, yet "ironically . . . has not shown the same concern about excessiveness and disproportionality when 
the punishment is imprisonment"); Erwin Chemerinsky, Is Any Sentence Cruel and Unusual Punishment?,
39-May TRIAL 78 (2003) (critically analyzing Ewing and Andrade); Adam M. Gershowitz, Note, The 
Supreme Court’s Backward Proportionality Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Review of Excessive 
Criminal Punishments and Excessive Punitive Damages Awards, 86 VA. L. REV. 1249, 1279, 1302 (2000) 
(positing that “virtually no appellate protection against disproportionate criminal punishments exists” under 
current law, and urging Supreme Court to “reconsider its decisions”); Steven Grossman, Proportionality in 
Non-Capital Sentencing: The Supreme Court’s Tortured Approach to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 84 
KY. L.J. 107 (1995-1996); Kelly A. Patch, Note, Harmelin v. Michigan: Is Proportionate Sentencing 
Merely Legislative Grace?, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1697, 1722 (Court’s decision in Harmelin “eviscerates” 
Eighth Amendment guarantee and “offends … evolving standards of decency”); Nicholas N. Kittrie and 
Mark H. Allenbaugh, Jean Valjean Lives, LEGAL TIMES, May 2, 2003 (“After Andrade and Ewing, if any 
legislature … in its wisdom chooses to enact harsh and excessive penalties, far be it from the Supreme 
Court to correct the wrongs.”); Charles Lane, California’s “3-Strikes” Law Upheld: Supreme Court 
Decides Long Prison Terms Legal, WASH. POST, p. A01, Mar. 6, 2003 (“The fact that these sentences don’t 
violate the [Constitution] makes it harder to imagine any case in which the court is going to find a sentence 
grossly disproportionate.”) (quoting Professor Erwin Chemerinsky).  
14 See, e.g., Rico v. Terhune, 63 Fed. Appx. 394, 394, 2003 WL 21186323 (9th Cir. 2003) (Reinhardt, J., 
specially concurring) (rejecting Eighth Amendment habeas challenge to 25-year-to-life recidivist sentence 
triggered by petty theft) (“I concur only under compulsion of the Supreme Court decision in Andrade.  I 
believe the sentence is both unconscionable and unconstitutional.”); see also id. (Pregerson, J., dissenting in 
part) (“In good conscience, I can’t vote to go along with the sentence imposed in this case.”).
15 See, e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1029 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he notion that this sentence satisfies 
any meaningful requirement of proportionality is itself both cruel and unusual.”).
16 See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 31-32 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding that the Court’s 
plurality opinion did “not convincingly establish that 25 years-to-life is a ‘proportionate’ punishment for 
stealing three golf clubs,” but voting to uphold challenged sentence on the ground that Eighth Amendment 
contains no proportionality guarantee); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (“I view the sentence as unjust and disproportionate to the offense.  Nevertheless, … I 
reluctantly conclude that the Court’s decision in Rummel … is controlling on the facts before us..”).
5in the Constitution – and the Court says that it is17 – then why choose to apply that 
principle “narrowly” in cases that happen to involve prison sentences?  Such a path 
appears political, not judicial.18
On the other hand, conservative jurists like Justices Scalia and Thomas argue that 
even the Court’s present narrow judicial review of noncapital sentences is improper, and
urge the explicit overruling of the contrary holding in Solem.  Their views can claim a
significant pedigree.  Ever since its inception, the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment 
sentencing jurisprudence has been criticized by originalist Justices who argue that when 
the Eighth Amendment was enacted, “cruel and unusual punishment” meant torturous 
methods of punishment, but not overlong prison sentences, and that this meaning must 
govern today.19
The fight over limits on prison sentencing is one of a family of controversies that 
have arisen from the Court's recent decisions in the broad area of proportionality review
– of identifying constitutional limits on the magnitude of sanctions an official 
decisionmaker may impose for a given wrongful act.  The death penalty is the most 
prominent example.  In the recent cases of Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, the 
17 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (asserting that “[t]he Eighth Amendment succinctly 
prohibits ‘excessive’ sanctions”); but see U.S. CONST., amend. VIII (prohibiting “excessive” fines and bail, 
but “cruel and unusual” punishments).
18 Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1062-63 (2004) ("A 
review of the cases concerning th[e] . . . different types of punishments reveals profound inconsistencies in 
the Supreme Court's approach."); Mary K. Woodburn, Note, Harmelin v. Michigan and Proportionality 
Review Under the Eighth Amendment, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1927, 1942 (1992) (“Objective [Eighth 
Amendment] inquiry is not only possible, but required.  … That the inquiry may be difficult and 
complicated does not excuse the [Supreme] Court from undertaking it.’); Tony Mauro, Supreme Court OKs 
Three Strikes Statutes, Megan’s Laws, AM. LAWYER, March 6, 2003 (“Th[e recent] rulings demonstrate 
once again that in the area of criminal law, the Court’s instincts are quite conservative and more deferential 
to state judgments than they are in other areas of the law.”) (quoting ACLU legal director Steven Shapiro).
19 See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961-985 
(opinion of Scalia, J.); Weems, 217 U.S. at 389-411 (White, J., dissenting).  
6same Supreme Court that applies the Eighth Amendment cautiously to noncapital 
sentences has issued freewheeling opinions that hold the death penalty for first degree 
murder to be categorically unconstitutional for offenders under age 1820 or the mildly 
retarded.21  The Court has also imposed significant restrictions on the magnitude of 
punitive damage awards in civil litigation, grounding these limits not in the Eighth 
Amendment,22 but in the due process guarantee of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.23
These "proportionality" decisions exert friction on one another along multiple 
axes.  It is hard to square the Court's restrained review of prison sentences with its 
aggressive review of death sentences.  Nor is it obvious that the fining of corporations in 
the form of punitive damages should be reviewed with skepticism while the imprisoning 
of individuals, a more severe deprivation, is reviewed deferentially.  Finally, there is a
normative question: If one concludes that these different lines of decisions are 
incompatible, then which doctrine ought to yield to which?  
The principal task of this Article is to present and defend a unified analysis of the 
Court's prison sentencing jurisprudence culminating in Harmelin and Ewing.  I argue that 
the prison cases extend the classic New Deal doctrine of Fourteenth Amendment 
rationality scrutiny to the magnitude of individual terms of imprisonment.  In other 
20
 Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (Mar. 2, 2005).
21
 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
22 See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989) (holding that the 
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment does not limit punitive damages awards in private civil 
litigation).
23 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (holding that $145 million punitive 
damages verdict against insurer for bad-faith failure to settle and other torts violated 14th Amendment due 
process when compensatory damages were only $1million and verdict relied upon evidence of out-of-state 
conduct).
7words, Ewing and its predecessor cases seek arbitrary and capricious sentences that give 
rise to an inference of irrationality or bias on the part of the decisionmaker — the same 
kind of procedural defect that implicates the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause 
limits on general legislative action.  
The Article's secondary task is to use the analysis of the prison sentencing cases 
to evaluate the other areas of constitutional proportionality review.  I conclude that, at 
least outside of the unique area of capital punishment, constitutional proportionality 
review should follow the principles deployed in the Eighth Amendment prison sentencing 
cases.  
Accordingly, in Part I of this Article, I briefly discuss the legal framework of 
Fourteenth Amendment rationality scrutiny. Part II traces the development of the 
Supreme Court’s noncapital Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in a series of sometimes 
conflicting opinions that culminates in Harmelin v. Michigan and Ewing v. California. I 
show that the legal standard adopted by the pluralities in Harmelin and Ewing is best 
understood as rationality review of sentencing.   Part III presents normative arguments for 
conceiving noncapital Eighth Amendment review as rationality review, as Harmelin and 
Ewing have tacitly done.  Finally, Part IV examines the relationships between the use of 
rationality review in the prison sentencing context and the Supreme Court's holdings in 
related contexts such as punitive damages and capital punishment.
8I. THE STRUCTURE OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RATIONALITY
REVIEW
A. Four Modes of Due Process Review 
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment24 has played four roles at 
different times in its 137-year history.  As befits its name, it has been a source of bedrock 
procedural guarantees such as the reasonable doubt standard of proof25 and the 
requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard before being deprived of liberty or 
property.26  Second, it has provided the textual vehicle by which the courts have 
incorporated most of the guarantees of the federal Bill of Rights against the states.27
Third, and most controversially, it has served as a source of unenumerated "fundamental"
rights that implicate close judicial scrutiny, ranging from a right to keep slaves as 
property28 to a right to freedom of contract29 to a right to elective abortion.30 It is the 
24 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . .").
25
 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that due 
process in a criminal trial requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all elements of the charged offense).  
26
 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
27 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (incorporating Sixth Amendment right to counsel); 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (incorporating the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule).  There is a 
well-known debate, which falls outside the scope of this Article, about the propriety of reading the due 
process clause as incorporating the Bill of Rights, with many scholars suggesting that other constitutional 
provisions would better serve that role, such as the Ninth Amendment, see RANDY A. BARNETT, 
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004); JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980), or the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause, see 
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 181-214 (1998).  My analysis takes no sides in this debate, but 
does assume that the Eighth Amendment properly applies against the states on one or another basis.  See 
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
28 See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
29 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
30 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9fourth role that sheds light on the Eighth Amendment prison cases.  The clause has also 
been taken to impose a free-standing general prohibition against government action that 
is arbitrary and capricious.31  This is rationality review properly so called, and it is 
simultaneously universal and limited.  As applied to legislative action, such review 
requires only that the action "rest upon some rational basis within the knowledge and 
experience of the legislators," not that it overcome the sort of demanding burden imposed 
on laws that impinge a specifically recognized constitutional right.32
Rationality review became formalized as a distinctive level of constitutional 
scrutiny in the New Deal era, when the Supreme Court retreated from the aggressive 
enforcement of unenumerated economic liberties that had characterized the preceding 
era.  The rational basis standard received its classic articulation in 1938, in United States 
v. Carolene Products Co.33  Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products opinion famously 
suggested that laws infringing certain specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, interfering 
with the political process, or disadvantaging discrete and insular minorities would receive 
"more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment than . . . most other types of legislation."34  But as to the large remaining 
category of "other types of legislation," the courts would merely ensure that statutes were 
not irrational:
31
 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) ("the core of the concept" of due process is 
"protection against arbitrary action"); United States R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177 (1980) 
(legislation is invalid if it "achieves its purpose in a patently arbitrary or irrational way"); Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 511 (1934) (due process 
demands that laws not be "arbitrary or capricious"); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884). 
32
 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
33
 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
34 Id. at 152 n.4.
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The existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed[.]  
[L]egislation … is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the 
facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the 
assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and 
experience of the legislators. . . .
Where the existence of a rational basis for legislation whose 
constitutionality is attacked depends upon facts beyond the sphere of judicial 
notice, such facts may properly be made the subject of judicial inquiry . . . and the 
constitutionality of a statute predicated upon the existence of a particular state of 
facts may be challenged by showing to the court that those facts have ceased to 
exist.35
Regulatory statutes would be upheld as long as it was "at least debatable" that regulation 
was appropriate.36
The adoption of a modest and deferential form of Fourteenth Amendment review ,
in the form of the rationality standard, raised the prospect that courts might go further and 
simply abdicate the review of legislation that did not present a special basis for 
heightened scrutiny.  During the Cold War era, several Supreme Court opinions came 
close to this purely vestigial conception of rationality review.37 As discussed in the 
35 Id. at 152-53 (citations and footnote omitted).
36 Id. at 154.
37
 In Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), eight Justices dismissively rejected a due process challenge 
to a Kansas statute limiting the practice of debt adjusting to lawyers.  Justice Black approvingly cited 
Justice Holmes's contention that "a state legislature can do whatever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained 
by some express prohibition in the Constitution of the United States."  Id. at 730.  Black added that "relief, 
if any be needed, lies not with us but with the body constituted to pass laws for the State of Kansas."  Id. at 
732.  Interestingly, Justice Harlan chose to concur separately, affirming in a single sentence the more 
traditional conception of rationality review under which "th[e] state measure [must] bea[r] a rational 
relation to a constitutionally permissible objective."  Id. at 733 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).  
In Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), the Court unanimously affirmed, after a 
speculative search for a possible legitimate interest, an Oklahoma statute forbidding opticians to fit 
eyeglass lenses into new frames without a written prescription from an opthalmologist or optometrist, and 
forbidding advertisements for eyeglass frames.  "We cannot say that the regulation has no rational relation 
to th[e] objective [of public health] and therefore is beyond constitutional bounds."  Id. at 491; see also 
Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1566 
(2004) (arguing that Carolene Products imposed a "virtually conclusive" and "ferociously strong" 
presumption of constitutionality that "effectively . . . abolished" due process review in the area of 
commercial legislation).  
Lund and McGinnis also contend that all such challenges to economic regulations have failed in 
the modern era.  Id.; but cf. Eastern Enter. v. Apfel, 524 US 498 (1998) (invalidating as unconstitutional a 
11
following subsection, however, the Court has more recently returned to the original 
conception of rationality review first set out in Carolene Products.  In this Article, 
"rationality review" denotes a genuine test, one that can be violated in extreme or unusual 
circumstances, instead of a euphemism decorating a judicial decision to abdicate review 
of state action in a particular area.  The latter sort of review will be distinguished by the 
term "vestigial review."
B. Characteristics of Rationality Review 
As outlined in Carolene Products and reinforced by subsequent cases ( apart from 
the Cold War-era dalliance with vestigial review), Fourteenth Amendment rationality 
scrutiny has four salient characteristics.  
1. Great deference for legislative judgments.  The standard is easy to satisfy.
Courts will not hold that a statute or other state action violates due process merely 
because it appears unwise.  Invalidations are rare.  
2. Respect for moral diversity among jurisdictions.  One of the key steps in the 
demise of Lochner was the Court's assimilation of Justice Holmes's aphorism that "the 
14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics," or any other social 
philosophy.38  Because the Constitution "is made for people of fundamentally differing 
views," a court gauging whether a statute bears a reasonable relation to a proper 
legislative aim must bear in mind that the law may pursue a wide range of moral aims, 
federal coal mining statute that retroactively assigned extensive pension liabilities to a former employer 
that had left the coal business 35 years prior to the statute's enactment, and that had not participated in the 
promises that gave rise to pension liability, in a judgment whose necessary fifth vote was supplied by 
Justice Kennedy on the theory that the statute's application violated due process rationality review).
38 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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and that different government actors may place different degrees of weight on these 
aims.39
3. A challenger must satisfy a significant initial burden before the court will 
engage in weighing evidence.  A statute is presumed constitutional,40 and if the reviewing 
court can consider the statute on its face and conclude, based on "facts [within] the sphere 
of judicial notice," that it rests on a rational basis, then that settles the matter.41  The 
statute may be justified by "rational speculation" on the part of the state.42  Indeed, the 
government need not even present evidence.43  Only if the statute appears irrational at 
first consideration will the court turn to weighing evidence in the record.44
4.  A recurrent emphasis on whether substantive outcomes suggest procedural 
defects such as bias, caprice, or bad faith.  A court invalidating state action under 
rationality review will frequently argue that the substantive disposition before the court, 
by its enormity, gives rise to an inference of procedural defect.  An "arbitrary" or 
"irrational" decision is not merely incorrect; rather, it would seem to convict the 
decisionmaker of at least some measure of dereliction of duty, of gross incompetence, 
39 Id. (arguing that the Constitution "is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of 
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire."). 
40
 National R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 477 (1985); 
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153.
41 Id.
42 FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
43
 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993); Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 313; Carolene Products, 
304 U.S. at 152.
44 See Fritz, 449 U.S. at 176 (finding a federal statute conferring retirement benefits satisfied due process 
challenge when its "plain language" disclosed possible rational basis).
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bias, malice, or bad faith.45  This idea helps make sense of the famous first appearance of 
the concept of "substantive" due process in American law: Justice Chase's separate 
opinion in Calder v. Bull, which took it as obvious that a statute that by its terms "takes 
property from A and gives it to B" would violate due process of law.46  If the claim is 
plausible, its plausibility rests not only upon the undesirability of the substantive outcome 
created by the hypothetical "A to B" statute, but by the suspicion it arouses that the 
legislature is exercising a grudge against A, or has simply been bought and paid for, and 
is discharging a crude political favor owed to "B" or his benefactors.47 Overtones of 
rationality review, with its characteristic implication of bad faith or procedural taint in the 
state action invalidated, had also appeared in the early economic due process decisions of 
the Gilded Age.48
C. Justifying Rationality Review
Rationality review has been one of the less controversial legal doctrines drawn 
from the due process clause.  While particular applications of rationality review have 
45 See County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 847 n.8 (holding that executive action violates substantive due 
process if it is "egregious" and "outrageous"); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 
439 (1985) (invalidating denial of a use permit for a group home housing the mentally retarded, pursuant to 
a municipal ordinance, on the basis that ordniance reflected illegitimate prejudice against the retarded); 
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723-26 (1969) (holding that due process is violated by "vindictive" 
judicial resentencing of a previously sentenced defendant after a successful appeal); Craigmiles v. Giles, 
312 F.3d 220, 225 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that legislation that failed rationality scrutiny "c[a]me close to 
striking us with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish") (internal quotation marks omitted)
46
 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387 (1798) (emphasis omitted).
47 Cf. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 228-29 (condemning state licensure requirements for casket sales as a "naked 
attempt to raise a fortress protecting the monopoly rents that funeral directors extract from consumers" 
motivated by an "illegitimate purpose").
48
 The Lochner Court, for example, dismissed the New York statute regulating the working hours of bakers 
as a "mere meddlesome interferenc[e]" and noted that "many laws of this character, while passed under 
what is claimed to be the police power for protecting the public health or welfare are, in reality, passed 
from other motives."  198 U.S. at 61, 64.
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been fiercely controverted,49 criticism of the doctrine that manifestly arbitrary and 
capricious official acts violate due process has been limited to the more  positivist wing 
of contemporary conservative jurisprudence.50
Rationality review, properly carried out, does not engage in fine-tuned balancing 
of competing interests.  Rather, it invalidates only substantive dispositions that are so 
egregious that they give rise to inferences of procedural impropriety.  It is indeed jarring 
to suggest that a guarantee of "due process" prohibits a legislature from enacting a law 
forbidding second-trimester abortions;51 the powerful, good-faith interests on both sides 
of the issue make plain that any objection to such a statute must be a matter of substance, 
not procedure.  But consider a hypothetical state statute that requires all motor vehicles in 
the state to be driven only in reverse gear.  Under current law, this statute would violate 
the rationality requirement of the due process clause, and no other constitutional 
provision.52  Is it really so paradoxical to say that this statute, by its very nature, is not 
only substantively objectionable but procedurally suspect?  To the contrary.  What one 
49 See, e.g., Robert F. Nagel, Playing Defense in Colorado, FIRST THINGS 83:34 (May 1998), which 
criticizes the holding in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), invalidating, under rational basis scrutiny, a 
popularly adopted amendment to the Colorado constitution prohibiting the recognition of homosexual 
status as a basis for special status or antidiscrimination claims.  Nagel argues that if the Court had paid 
more attention in Romer to the "social context" and the legal backdrop against which the amendment was 
enacted, it might have found that the amendment was intended to stave off future attempts to disrupt 
important social institutions through reform litigation exploiting antidiscrimination principles, and that this 
motivation might well have given the amendment a rational basis.  See id. (suggesting that voters were 
"playing defense against a law reform strategy designed to bring on social revolution without popular 
consent.").
50
 Robert H. Bork argues, against the Carolene Products Court, that "a conclusive presumption of 
constitutionality" should apply to all legislation not within the specific prohibitions of the Constitution.  
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 58-59 (1990).
.
51 See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
52
 It would be extremely difficult to frame the constitutional objection to this statute as an equal protection 
challenge, for all drivers and all motor vehicles are equally subject to the statute.  The hypothetical is thus a 
useful illustration of the analytical distinctness of equal protection rationality review and due process 
rationality review, though they frequently overlap in practice. 
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wants to say of a legislature capricious enough to enact this statute is, precisely, that it is
not doing its job: it is instead engaging in private jokes, or (what is more likely) in simple 
bullying. 
This connection to the idea of procedure is why it is more intuitive to argue that 
the Due Process Clause prohibits official irrationality than it is to argue that the clause 
protects certain unenumerated substantive rights.53 It is noteworthy that both of the 
originalist Justices on the current Supreme Court, as well as Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
accept the practice of rationality review.54
II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE RATIONALITY STANDARD IN EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT SENTENCING LAW
Over the course of a century, the Supreme Court has developed an Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence of noncapital sentencing under the pressure of a recurring 
originalist critique which claims that the Clause was intended to prohibit only “cruel and 
53 Academic criticisms of "substantive due process" focus on the practice of enforcing unenumerated rights, 
and rarely address the practice of general rationality review. See, e.g., Lund & McGinnis, supra note 37, at 
1558-60, 1562-67 (discussing Dred Scott and Lochner as "paradigm[s] for the . . . development of 
substantive due process" in that they involved judges "illegitimately legislating from the bench" and 
invalidating statutes that were simply "[o]ffensive to their moral and political sensibilities," but passing 
over the rationality requirement of Carolene Products as simply a means of "effectively . . . abolish[ing]" 
due process review of general legislation); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW (1998) (arguing that "it may or may not be a good thing to guarantee additional 
liberties, but the Due Process Clause quite obviously does not bear that interpretation.  By its inescapable 
terms, it guarantees only process."); John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 
83 VA. L. REV. 493, 500-01 (1997) (considering and criticizing various models of substantive due process 
such as a "vested rights" approach, a formal requirement of legislative generality, and the free-wheeling 
"real substantive due process" approach of Lochner, but offering only a passing mention of the Carolene 
Products requirement of "minimum rationality").
54
 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003), which argued that proposed rights that are not firmly rooted in Anglo-
American tradition and history "may be abridged or abrogated pursuant to a validly enacted state law if that 
law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest."
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unusual” modes of punishment, such as torture or drawing and quartering.55 Though the 
sequence of opinions has not displayed a smooth and orderly development of doctrine,56
it has lately converged on a standard that is normatively attractive, fits plausibly with the 
Eighth Amendment's historical background, and is coherent with several adjacent bodies 
of law.  This standard calls upon courts to ensure that prison sentences rest on some 
rational basis and are not a product of official arbitrariness.
A. Early Decisions
1. Weems v. United States
The Supreme Court first indicated that the Constitution permitted review of terms 
of imprisonment in the early twentieth century case of Weems v. United States.57  A Coast 
55
 That the Clause reaches at least the latter sort of state action, prohibiting barbarous modes of corporal 
and capital punishment, has never been seriously disputed.  See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) 
(holding that Alabama prison officials violated clearly established Eighth Amendment law by cuffing 
refractory prisoners to "hitching posts" without shirts, bathroom breaks, or adequate water for hours at a 
time); Harmelin, 510 U.S. at 976 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (“According to its terms … the Clause disables the 
Legislature from authorizing … cruel methods of punishment that are not regularly or customarily 
employed.”); Anthony Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted”: The Original Meaning, 
57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 839-842 (1969).
56 See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (acknowledging that Supreme Court's precedents in 
noncapital Eighth Amendment context "have not been a model of clarity").
57
 217 U.S. 349 (1910).  Some earlier opinions had suggested a different view.  In In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 
436 (1890), the Court rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge to New York’s use of electrocution on the 
ground that the amendment did not apply against the states. But it went on to hold that Kemmler’s due 
process rights were not violated either, opining that
[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the 
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the 
Constitution.  It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than 
the mere extinguishment of life.
Id. at 447.    
The Court sidestepped the issue in O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892), which rejected an 
Eighth Amendment challenge to a state sentence of over 54 years for bootlegging, again on the ground that 
the Eighth Amendment did not bind the states.  Id. at 332.  However, three Justices urged in dissent that the 
Eighth Amendment should apply to the case.  They asserted that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause prohibited “all punishments which, by their excessive length or severity, are greatly disproportioned 
to the offenses charged.”  Id. at 339-340 (Field, J., dissenting).
On the other hand, the vast weight of pre-Weems lower court authority interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment or related state constitutional provisions held that “cruel and unusual” or “cruel or unusual” 
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Guard clerk in the Philippines, Weems was convicted of falsifying a single entry in a 
government ledger.58  The Philippine penal code punished this offense with twelve to 
twenty years in cadena temporal, a regime of penalties that originated in Spanish law.59
Prisoners were kept constantly shackled at the wrists and ankles and put to “hard and 
painful labor.”60  They were also deprived of parental, family, and property rights during 
the term of imprisonment (“civil interdiction”); barred for life from any position of public 
trust (“perpetual absolute disqualification”); and subjected for life to “the surveillance of 
the authorities,” which prohibited them from changing their residence without official 
permission.61  Weems received a sentence of fifteen years in cadena temporal, which the 
territorial supreme court affirmed.62
The Supreme Court chose to evaluate the sentence under the cruel and unusual 
punishments clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights, which was identical to the federal 
Eighth Amendment.63  The court held that any sentence of cadena temporal within the 
statutory range would be cruel and unusual punishment for Weems’s offense, and 
meant only improper modes of punishment.  Representative cases include Hobbs v. State, 32 N.E. 1019, 
1020-21 (Ind. 1893); State v. White, 25 P. 33, 34-35 (Kan. 1890); Comm. v. Hitchings, 71 Mass. 482, 486 
(1855).  See also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 983-85 (opinion of Scalia, J.); Weems, 217 U.S. at 402-07 (White, 
J., dissenting) (collecting authorities).  
The Weems majority declined to make “an extended review of the cases in the state courts.”  Id. at 
377.
58 Id. at 357-58.
59 Id. at 358, 363-64, 368.
60 Id. at 364.
61 Id. at 364-65.
62 Id. at 358.
63 Id. at 365, 367.  Weems had not raised below the argument that his sentence was cruel and unusual.  Id.
at 362.
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dismissed the indictment against him.64  The Court’s opinion was elusive, ranging 
broadly but difficult to pin down to any particular principle of decision.65  At times it 
stressed the alien, unusual character of cadena temporal, and the harsh regime of physical 
penalties and legal disabilities that it added to simple imprisonment.66  But other parts of 
the majority opinion seemed to focus on the principle of proportionality, emphasizing 
that “such penalties for such offenses amaze those who … believe that it is a precept of 
justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense,” and 
asking, “[i]s this also a precept of the fundamental law?”67  The balance of the opinion 
implied that the answer was yes.68
2. The Originalist Critique in Weems
Two features of Weems impress the reader at a century’s distance.  The first is the 
strongly nonoriginalist theory of constitutional interpretation that underpins Justice 
64 Id. at 366, 382.  Justice McKenna wrote for a four-Justice majority.  Justice Lurton did not participate.
65
 Justice White’s dissent took note of this quality.  See id. at 385 (White, J., dissenting) (“I find it 
impossible to fix with precision the meaning which the court gives to [the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause].”). 
66 See id. at 366 (“He is forever kept under the shadow of his crime, forever kept within voice and view of 
the criminal magistrate. … No circumstance of degradation is omitted.  It may be that even the cruelty of 
pain is not omitted.  He must bear a chain night and day.  He is condemned to painful as well as hard 
labor.”); 377 (“[T]he law under consideration … has no fellow in American legislation.  Let us remember 
that it has come to us from a government of a different form and genius from ours.”).  
Of course, an interpretation of Weems that sought to base its holding of unconstitutionality on the 
potentially “cruel and unusual” penalty of painful labor in perpetual chains, cf. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 990-
92 (opinion of Scalia, J.), would have to acknowledge that the use of chained labor gangs was not 
unfamiliar to common-law jurisdictions of the era.  See Weems, 217 U.S. at 411-12 (White, J., dissenting) 
(citing nineteenth-century English criminal statute establishing different degrees of hard labor).  Indeed, 
some contemporary American jurisdictions have employed such punishments.  See, e.g., Rick Bragg, 
Alabama to Make Prisoners Break Rocks, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1995, at 5 (describing Alabama’s re-
institution of chained work gangs for prisoners).   
67 Id. at 366-67. 
68 See id. at 373 (“We cannot think that the possibility of a coercive cruelty being exercised through other 
forms of punishment was overlooked [by the Framers].”); 379 (comparing “the mischief and the remedy” 
in Weems’s sentence); Note, What Is Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 24 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1910).
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McKenna’s majority opinion.  Writing decades before the content of the Eighth 
Amendment was judicially pegged to “the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society,”69 McKenna stressed that:
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.  
Therefore, a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the 
mischief which gave it birth.  This is peculiarly true of constitutions.  … In the 
application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what 
has been, but of what may be.70
Other language similarly reminds one that Weems was a contemporary of the famous due 
process decision in Lochner v. New York.71  Justice McKenna, a member of the Lochner 
majority, based his opinion in Weems on a general principle of broad interpretation of 
constitutional guarantees, and specifically supported his view with the example of the 
expansive “construction of the 14th Amendment” that the Supreme Court had employed
in the decades preceding Weems.72
The second notable trait of Weems is the powerful originalist analysis found in 
Justice White’s dissenting opinion.  White drew on English and founding-era history, as 
well as nineteenth-century judicial authorities, to argue that the Eighth Amendment did 
not authorize a general proportionality review of sentences.73
69 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion); see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
70 Weems, 217 U.S. at 373.
71
 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
72 Weems, 217 U.S. at 374.
73 Indeed, Justice Scalia’s separate opinion in Harmelin, the locus classicus of conservative opposition to 
proportionality review, restates many of the arguments and authorities found in Justice White’s Weems 
dissent from 81 years before. Compare Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 966-985 (opinion of Scalia, J.) with Weems, 
217 U.S. at 389-411 (White, J., dissenting).
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Justice White noted that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishment duplicated language in the English Bill of Rights of 1689.74  He concluded 
that the historical impetus for the clause arose from abusive sentences handed down by 
judges, particularly those in the trial of the notorious seventeenth-century perjurer Titus 
Oates.  The judges of King's Bench "t[ook] special care" of Oates by fashioning a novel 
and vindictive sentence: he was to be "whipped from Newgate to Tyburn" by the 
common hangman, then displayed annually in the pillories in different parts of London, 
at times that corresponded to specific dates in Oates's perjured accounts of events.75  As 
adopted by the colonies, the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment was, in Justice 
White's view, principally a prohibition of cruel and barbarous modes of punishment.  To 
the extent it also had to do with the simple magnitude of punishments, the clause placed 
limits on courts, but not (as the Weems majority held) on legislatures.  In other words, it 
was: 
a direct and controlling prohibition upon the legislative branch (as well as all 
other departments), restraining it from authorizing or directing the infliction of the 
cruel bodily punishments of the past, which was one of the evils sought to be 
prevented . . . by the English Bill of Rights, and also retrained the courts from 
exerting and Congress from empowering them to select and exert by way of 
discretion modes of punishment which were not usual, or usual modes of 
punishment to a degree not usual, and which could alone be imposed by express 
authority of law.76
  White supplied voluminous supporting citations from nineteenth-century state 
courts interpreting analogous provisions of their state constitutions.77  He concluded that 
74 Weems, 217 U.S. at 390 (White, J., dissenting).
75 Id. at 391 n.1, citing 10 Howell's State Trials 1227, 1316-17 (K.B. 1685).
76 Id. at 397 (White, J., dissenting).
77 Id. at 401-07 & n.3. 
21
no courts prior to Weems had taken the view that the prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment set limits on the magnitude (rather than the kind) of legislative sanctions. 78
3. Consequences
Weems offered uncertain guidance to the development of Eighth Amendment 
sentencing law.  The closest thing to a standard of review that could be gleaned from its 
analysis was that sentences that “amaze[d]” federal judges were invalid.79 It was possible 
to view the holding in Weems as turning on the case’s unusual facts – a sentence that 
originated under a foreign code and encompassed a harsh array of additional penalties
beyond simple imprisonment.  Perhaps for these reasons, Weems did not usher in a period 
of constitutional review of prison sentencing.80
The issue of Eighth Amendment noncapital review did not become salient again 
until the 1960s and 1970s, when some federal and state courts began to invoke Weems to 
strike down prison sentences as disproportionate.81  During this period, the Fourth Circuit
78 Id. at 407-09.
79 Id. at 366.  Later courts sometimes cited Weems as if it prefigured the “gross disproportionality” standard 
that a majority of the Court eventually embraced.  E.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 997 (plurality opinion); 
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 290 (Powell, J., dissenting); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788, 800 (1982).  
Actually, it did not.  When Weems is read without hindsight bias, it appears that the opaque 
majority opinion merely noted – rather than adopted – Justice Field’s formulation that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibited sentences “greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged.”  Weems, 217 U.S. at 
371 (quoting O’Neil, 144 U.S. at 340 (Field, J., dissenting)) (punctuation omitted).  Indeed, Weems’s 
citation to the O’Neil dissent seems to be offered simply to illustrate the point that “[n]o case has occurred 
in this court which has called for an exhaustive definition” of the Eighth Amendment’s scope.  Id. (noting 
that in O’Neil “the question was raised but not decided”).
80
 In Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912), the Court dismissively rejected an Eighth Amendment 
proportionality challenge to a life sentence imposed on a three-time horse thief.  See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 
276-77 (describing the Graham litigation).  Thereafter the Eighth Amendment noncapital proportionality 
doctrine lay inert in the Supreme Court for several decades.  See Charles Walter Schwartz, Eighth 
Amendment Proportionality Analysis and the Compelling Case of William Rummel, 71 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 378, 386-87 (1980).  Schwartz’s article gives a detailed discussion of Eighth Amendment 
sentencing law in the lower courts between Weems and Rummel.
81 See Schwartz, supra note 80, at 396-406.  Of course, this was a period of active Supreme Court 
decisionmaking in capital cases under the Eighth Amendment.  The Court declared most then-existing 
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devised an influential four-factor test for proportionality in Hart v. Coiner.82 These 
decisions formed the backdrop to the Supreme Court’s next major encounter with 
noncapital proportionality review, which came in 1980.
B. Vestigial Scrutiny 
1. Rummel v. Estelle
Rummel v. Estelle83 was the first Supreme Court case squarely to present the 
question whether a simple sentence of imprisonment could be unconstitutionally 
disproportionate.  Justice Rehnquist, writing for a five-Justice majority,84 took a skeptical 
view.  Rummel’s narrow holding was important enough: the Court upheld a mandatory 
life sentence (with potential parole after 12 years) imposed under a Texas recidivist 
statute on Rummel, who was convicted of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses after two 
convictions for equally minor, but felonious frauds.85
death penalty statutes unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), on the ground that the 
“freakish” and unpredictable imposition of the death sentence rendered it cruel and unusual.  Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) later upheld the constitutionality of a new generation of state death 
penalty statutes revised in light of Furman. In Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977), the majority 
explicitly applied a “gross proportionality” analysis to capital sentencing and held that it was per se cruel 
and unusual punishment to impose death for the rape of an adult woman.   
The Court decided one notable noncapital proportionality case in the period.  In Robinson v. 
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Court squarely endorsed the incorporation of the Eighth Amendment 
against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.  Robinson held it an Eighth Amendment violation to 
impose any criminal punishment on a defendant for being addicted to narcotics.  However, Robinson’s
holding shed little light on what penalties were allowable for activities that could be punished as crimes.
82
 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973) (invalidating a life sentence imposed under recidivist statute on defendant 
whose three felony convictions were for perjury and minor check fraud).  The Hart test required courts to 
weigh: (1) the seriousness of the triggering offense; (2) interjurisdictional comparisons (i.e., comparing the 
defendant’s penalty to that imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense); (3) intrajurisdictional 
comparisons (comparing the defendant’s crime with the other crimes assigned a similar penalty in the 
defendant’s jurisdiction); and (4) the legislative purpose behind the sentence imposed.  Id. at 140-42.
83
 445 U.S. 263 (1980).  
84
 Justice Stewart concurred in a brief opinion.  Justice Powell dissented, joined by Justices Brennan, 
Marshall, and Stevens.
85 Id. at 264-66, 280.  A divided panel of the Fifth Circuit had voted to grant Rummel habeas relief from his 
sentence under the proportionality analysis of Hart v. Coiner, see 568 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1978).   The court
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Of even greater interest was the majority’s mode of analysis.  In one voice, Justice 
Rehnquist set aside Weems as turning on “the unique nature of the punishments” there, 
and stressed the Court’s “reluctance to review legislatively mandated terms of 
imprisonment.”86 He explicitly linked this cautious approach to Eighth Amendment 
review of prison terms with the Court's cautious approach to substantive due process 
review under the Fourteenth Amendment, invoking Justice Holmes's Lochner dissent for 
the proposition that the Constitution "is made for people of fundamentally differing 
views."87  The Rummel opinion was salted with suggestions that proportionality review of 
prison terms simply did not exist, except perhaps in cases involving misdemeanors:  
[O]ne could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this 
Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies … 
the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative 
prerogative.88
However, in other portions of its opinion, the Rummel Court offered some scraps 
of proportionality reasoning.  It noted that heightened penalties for recidivism were 
constitutionally permissible and stated that “a proper assessment of Texas’s treatment of 
Rummel” would take the availability of parole into account.  The Court endorsed the 
view that Rummel’s punishment could be predicated on a combination of different 
philosophical grounds, including the utilitarian interests of deterring and incapacitating
en banc vacated that opinion and affirmed denial of the writ.  587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978).  See generally 
Schwartz, supra note 80, at 412-420 (giving an overview of the Rummel litigation and the arguments 
raised; concluding that in rejecting Rummel's claim, "the Supreme Court . . . reached a fair resolution of [a] 
difficult constitutional problem.").
86 Id. at 274.  Justice Rehnquist’s opposition in Rummel to searching judicial review of prison sentences 
rested on noninterpretive, pragmatic grounds.  His opinion said little about the text or history of the Eighth 
Amendment.  The Rummel majority did not revisit the originalist critique of proportionality review that 
Justice White had offered in Weems.
87 Id. at 282, quoting Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
88 Id.
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recidivists as well as the purely retributive interest in punishing his triggering offense.89
In an important but equivocal footnote, the majority conceded that “extreme” noncapital
sentences such as life imprisonment for overtime parking might be invalid under the 
Eighth Amendment.90 In fact, in another passage, the majority declined to express a view 
on the rather less theoretical question of whether Rummel could have been 
constitutionally sentenced to life imprisonment for his $120 fraud if it had been his first 
offense.91
Four Justices dissented, arguing that the Eighth Amendment should be interpreted 
to prohibit "grossly excessive punishments" in noncapital cases, even when the mode of 
punishment employed was not barbarous or torturous, and that Rummel's sentence 
violated this standard.92  In judging whether a sentence was grossly excessive, the 
dissenters would have looked to "the nature of the offense" and to inter- and 
intrajurisdictional comparisons of the punishments for similar offenses.93 In the end, the 
dissenters concluded that Rummel's "mandatory life sentence for defrauding persons of 
about $230" (in three offenses) "crosse[d] any rationally drawn line" marking the limits 
89 Id. at 276, 284 (“The purpose[s] of a recidivist statute such as that involved here … are to deter repeat 
offenders and, at some point in the life of one who repeatedly commits criminal offenses serious enough to 
be classified as felonies, to segregate that person from the rest of society for an extended period of time.”).
90 See id. at 274 n.11.
91 Id. at 276.  This hypothetical is not far from the facts of the later case of Henderson v. Norris, 258 F.3d 
706 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that life sentence without parole was cruel and unusual punishment for selling 
a quarter of a gram of cocaine, the defendant’s first offense). 
92 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 293 (Powell, J., dissenting).
93 Id. at 295.  
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of proper punishment, and "would be viewed as grossly unjust by virtually every layman 
or lawyer."94
2. Hutto v. Davis
Scarcely a year later, the Rummel majority echoed Rummel’s deferential analysis 
in Hutto v. Davis.95 A Virginia jury gave Davis consecutive twenty-year sentences for 
each of two criminal counts: one for distributing marijuana, and one for possessin g it 
with intent to distribute.  The result was a forty-year sentence for about nine ounces of 
contraband.96  Davis had a criminal record,97 but his sentence was not premised on any
finding of recidivism.98  The en banc Fourth Circuit struck the sentence as cruel and 
unusual.99  The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of 
Rummel, which had just been decided.100  On remand the Fourth Circuit stuck by its 
judgment, affirming without opinion by the vote of an equally divided court.101
The Supreme Court then summarily reversed in a tart per curiam opinion that 
suggested the authorship of Justice Rehnquist or Chief Justice Burger.  To the five-Justice 
majority, Rummel stood for the near-total rejection of Eighth Amendment scrutiny of 
terms of imprisonment. The majority did not weigh the facts of Davis’s crime and 
94 Id. at 307.
95
 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam).
96 Id. at 370-71.
97 See id. at 375, 379 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
98 See id. at 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99
 Davis v. Davis, 601 F.2d 153, 154 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
100
 Hutto v. Davis, 445 U.S. 947 (1980).
101
 Davis v. Davis, 646 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1981).
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sentence or compare them with the facts of Rummel.  Rather, it stated that Rummel had 
“distinguished between punishments – such as the death penalty – which by their very 
nature differ from all other forms of conventionally accepted punishment, and 
punishments [such as imprisonment] which differ from others only in duration.”102  It 
glossed Rummel as holding that “the excessiveness of one prison term as compared to 
another is invariably a subjective determination,” implying that meaningful judicial 
review was impossible.103  Indeed, the majority impliedly accused the Fourth Circuit of 
judicial mutiny for entertaining a contestable disproportionality claim in the wake of 
Rummel.104
This reading of Rummel threatened to move beyond deferential review to a full
repudiation of Weems.  Yet as in Rummel, the majority could not quite bring itself to 
forswear a minimal form of rationality review.  A footnote in Davis repeated the 
concession in Rummel that life imprisonment for overtime parking might be 
unconstitutional.105
As in Rummel, four Justices took a sharply different view.  Justice Powell wrote 
a reluctant concurrence that rested entirely on Rummel’s stare decisis effect.106  Justice 
102 Davis, 454 U.S. at 373.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 374-75 (“[T]he Court of Appeals could be viewed as having ignored, consciously or 
unconsciously, the hierarchy of the federal court system created by the Constitution. … [U]nless we wish 
anarchy to prevail within the judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower 
federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be.”).
105 Id. at 374 n.3.
106 Id. at 375, 379 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).  Justice Powell complained that Rummel would 
now “often … compe[l]” lower courts “to accept sentences that arguably are cruel and unusual.”  Id. at 377. 
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Brennan, in dissent, disputed the majority’s interpretation of Rummel as precluding 
significant proportionality review of sentences.107
Rummel and Davis appeared to leave Eighth Amendment noncapital 
proportionality review in roughly the same place as Cold War-era review of economic 
legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment. In principle a vestigial power of judicial 
review was acknowledged for wildly inappropriate state action, but in practice the courts 
were to have little or nothing to do.108  Yet it also appeared that this understanding of the 
Eighth Amendment hung by one vote on the Supreme Court.  The reader’s views of a 
lower court's obligations in such a situation will determine her reaction to the fact that 
less than a year later, the Eighth Circuit struck down as cruel and unusual a life sentence 
imposed on a seven-time felony recidivist, Jerry Helm.109  Helm’s case reached the 
Supreme Court, where it produced both a significant holding and a swing away from the
minimal-rationality conception of noncapital sentencing review.  
D. Substantive Scrutiny: Solem v. Helm
107 Id. at 381-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Justices Marshall and Stevens joined this opinion.  Justice 
Brennan condemned what he considered “a serious and improper expansion of Rummel” by the majority.  
Id. at 382-83.  He characterized the per curiam opinion as a “complete abdication of our responsibility to 
enforce the Eighth Amendment,” and asserted that Davis’s sentence was “obvious[ly]” cruel and unusual.  
Id. at 383-84.  
108 See Grossman, supra note 13, at 122 (Davis "appeared to foreclose virtually any proportionality 
challenge in a non-capital case."); David S. Mackey, Rationality versus Proportionality: Reconsidering the 
Constitutional Limits on Criminal Sanctions, 51 TENN. L. REV. 623, 631 (1984).  Compare Gerald Gunther 
and Kathleen Sullivan, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 479-81 (13th ed. 1997) (reviewing the Cold War-era 
substantive due process cases and asking whether they amounted to a "total withdrawal from review").
109
 Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1982), aff’d, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
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In Solem v. Helm,110 the Court held, five to four, that a judge-imposed sentence of 
life imprisonment without parole was cruel and unusual punishment for uttering a “no 
account” check for $100, Helm’s seventh felony.
Under Rummel and Davis, Helm’s claim should have failed.111  His triggering 
offense was virtually identical to Rummel’s and his recidivist history was considerably 
worse.  Rummel’s only prior felonies were two small-time frauds; in contrast, Helm had 
six prior felonies, including relatively dangerous crimes such as drunk driving and three 
separate convictions for nonresidential burglary.112 The chief point in Helm’s favor was 
that his judge-imposed life sentence precluded the possibility of parole, whereas Rummel 
had been eligible for parole in 12 years under the operation of the Texas recidivist statute.  
However, Davis seemed to foreclose relief on this basis with its flat statement that “the 
excessiveness of one prison term as compared to another is invariably a subjective 
determination.”113 Helm’s sentence was also heavier than that available in any other 
jurisdiction except Nevada.114  But Rummel and Davis had squarely rejected the use of 
interjurisdictional comparisons in noncapital cases to establish an Eighth Amendment 
violation.115 Finally, Helm’s triggering fraud, while hardly earth-shattering, was an 
110
 463 U.S. 277 (1983).  
111 Cf. id. at 304, 311 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]oday’s holding cannot be rationally reconciled with 
Rummel. … [Davis] makes crystal clear that under Rummel it is error for appellate courts to second-guess 
… whether a given sentence of imprisonment is excessive in relation to the crime.”); Grossman, supra note 
13, at 128 (Solem Court’s attempt to distinguish Rummel and Davis was “unpersuasive”); Joshua Dressler, 
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 6.05[C] at 47 (1995) (Helm’s claim seemed “weak” in light of 
Rummel).
112 Solem, 463 U.S. at 279-280.
113 Davis, 454 U.S. at 373 (per curiam).
114 Solem, 463 U.S. at 298-300.
115 Davis, 454 U.S. at 373; Rummel, 445 U.S. at 280-82.
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example of genuine criminal conduct, malum in se, which distinguished his case from the 
extreme “no life imprisonment for overtime parking” hypothetical discussed in Rummel
and Davis.116
There was another stark difference between Rummel and Solem that one might 
have expected to feature more prominently in the Solem Court's opinion.  While the life 
sentence in Rummel was specifically commanded by the Texas recidivism statute,117 the 
South Dakota recidivism statute in Solem left Helm's sentence entirely at the discretion of 
a single trial judge, who could have sentenced Helm to any number of years for his 
triggering offense of passing a $100 bad check, but chose to impose the maximum 
possible sentence of life without parole.118  Helm's harsh sentence thus resulted not from 
a categorical judgment by the legislature, but from the discretionary (and arguably 
arbitrary) action of a single decisionmaker.119
At the level of Court personnel, Solem came out as it did because Justice 
Blackmun abandoned the coalition of Justices that had decided Rummel and Davis,
116 See Davis, 454 U.S. at 374 n.3; Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 n.11. 
117 See id. at 264 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE, art. 63 (1973), recodified as TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) 
(1974)) ("Whoever shall have been three times convicted of a felony . . . shall on such third conviction be 
imprisoned for life in the penitentiary").
118 See Solem, 463 U.S. at 281 & n.6 (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-6-1(2), 22-7-8 (1979)) (providing 
that punishment for a fourth felony conviction is automatically "enhanced to the sentence for a Class 1 
felony," which is punishable by a discretionary sentence up to life in prison without parole).
119
 The Solem Court reproduced the trial judge's colloquy with Helm at sentencing:
I think you certainly earned this sentence and certainly proven that you're an habitual criminal and 
the record would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation and that the only prudent thing to do is 
to lock you up for the rest of your natural life, so you won't have further victims of your crimes, 
just be coming back before courts.  You'll have plenty of time to think this one over.
463 U.S. at 282-83, quoting State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497, 500 (S.D. 1980) (Henderson, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Seventh Judicial Circuit Court, Pennington County, South Dakota).
30
providing a fifth vote for Justice Powell’s opinion for the Court.120  At the level of 
doctrine, Solem reflected a temporary swing back to the more ambitious passages in
Weems, that is, an attempt to reconceptualize Eighth Amendment sentencing law as a 
form of substantive scrutiny closely focused on retributive proportionality.
Justice Powell's Solem opinion embraced wholesale the three proportionality 
criteria rejected in Rummel and Davis: analysis of "the gravity of the offense and the 
harshness of the penalty"; of "the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same 
jurisdiction"; and of "the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other 
jurisdictions."121 The Solem opinion included several dramatic passages, as if to set the 
stage for future expansion of Eighth Amendment review.  In several places Justice Powell 
abandoned the more restrained "gross disproportionality" standard that he had urged in 
Rummel, and claimed instead a broad power to invalidate "sentences that are 
disproportionate to the crime committed."122 Powell also classified all of Helm’s six 
prior felony offenses as “nonviolent,”123 though this was surely a questionable 
characterization of Helm's conviction for three-time drunk driving.124
Chief Justice Burger and three other Justices joined an indignant dissent, arguing 
that Solem's "holding cannot rationally be reconciled with Rummel," and stressing the 
120
 Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens also joined Justice Powell’s opinion.  
121 Solem, 463 U.S. at 292. 
122 Id. at 284; see id. at 290 ("[W]e hold as a matter of principle that a criminal sentence must be 
proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted"); cf. id. at 303 (holding that Helm's 
"sentence is significantly disproportionate to his crime, and is therefore prohibited by the Eighth 
Amendment.").  
123 Id. at 279.
124 See id. at 280; cf. id. at 304 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("I reject the fiction that all Helm's crimes were 
innocuous or nonviolent.  Among his felonies were three burglaries and a third conviction for drunken 
driving.  By comparison Rummel was a relatively 'model citizen.'"). 
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perceived affront the Court had administered to the doctrine of stare decisis.125  Burger
also challenged the majority’s classification of Helm’s nonresidential burglary and 
repeated drunk driving convictions as “nonviolent.”126
Solem's broad statement that "disproportionate" sentences were unconstitutional 
presented the prospect of a generalized constitutional appellate review of state court 
prison sentences.127  Such a view would have given a thoroughly substantive cast to the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.  It would interpret it as incorporating a specific, 
debatable value judgment about penology that would displace contrary legislative 
approaches, even those adopted and pursued in good faith, much as the First Amendment 
incorporates a substantive judgment about the costs and benefits of speech regulation that 
displaces contrary judgments by the states.  In Fourteenth Amendment terms, Justice 
Powell's vision of constitutional sentencing review elevated it either to the tier of 
heightened scrutiny under the Carolene Products framework, or (in light of some of the 
more conciliatory passages sprinkled in the Solem opinion), to the more indefinite but 
still intrusive brand of scrutiny exemplified by Lochner.  However, this vision of the 
Eighth Amendment has not prevailed.  
E. Rationality Review: Harmelin v. Michigan
125 Id.; see id. at 305-312 (arguing that the holding in Solem was inconsistent with Rummel and Davis); id. 
at 315 ("If we are to have a system of laws, not men, Rummel is controlling."); 317 ("It is . . . curious that 
the Court should brush aside controlling precedents that are barely in the bound volumes of the United 
States Reports.").
126 Id. at 316 ("It is sheer fortuity that the places respondent burglarized were unoccupied and that he killed 
no pedestrians while behind the wheel. . . Four of respondent's crimes, I repeat, had harsh potentialities for 
violence.").
127 See id. at 315 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (expressing fear that "[t]o require appellate review of all 
sentences of imprisonment . . . will 'administer the coup de grace to the courts of appeals as we know 
them.'") (quoting Henry Friendly, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 36 (1973)). 
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After three major (and conflicting) opinions in three years, the Supreme Court left 
the Eighth Amendment issue alone for a time.  The lower courts gave Solem a cool 
reception.  Despite the potentially broad standard articulated in the case, no federal court 
of appeals (and only a handful of state courts) set aside a prison sentence on Eighth 
Amendment grounds in the eight years following Solem.128 This caution was well-
founded.  When, eight years later, a splintered Court next confronted the problem of 
noncapital proportionality review in Harmelin v. Michigan,129 it altered Solem doctrinally
and scaled back its scope of review.  
Harmelin is the key modern Eighth Amendment sentencing case. Though it 
yielded only a plurality opinion, it provided the constitutional standard that governs
today.130  Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion went further than any previous opinion had
128 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1015-16 & n.2 (White, J., dissenting). One must conclude that the lower 
courts did not take the bolder passages of Justice Powell’s Solem opinion at face value.  Granted, Solem 
declined to overrule the narrow holdings of Rummel and Davis, and those cases had upheld strict sentences.
It nevertheless strains credulity to think that no court of appeals, on habeas review or otherwise, confronted 
a prison sentence that was “disproportionate” to the crime, and distinguishable from Rummel and Davis, in 
the eight years between Solem and Harmelin.  Cf. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290, 303.
Professors Brannon Denning and Glenn Reynolds identify a pattern in which the lower federal 
courts sometimes hesitate to give full effect to a new decision that promises a burdensome expansion of 
judicial review.  Full enforcement may not follow until the Supreme Court reiterates its commitment to the 
new principle in later rulings.  See Brannon P. Denning and Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: 
The New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1253 (2003).  
Denning and Reynolds’s guiding example is the current reluctance of the lower federal courts to engage in 
meaningful review of legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause, despite the Supreme Court’s 
embrace of such review in United States v. Lopez, 519 U.S. 549 (1995) and United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 568 (2000).   See Denning and Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance, supra, 55 ARK. L. REV. at 1254-56.  
Solem’s cool reception in the 1980s may reflect an institutional resistance by the lower courts 
similar to the one that, in Denning and Reynolds’s view, characteries Lopez.
129
 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
130
 Later pluralities of the Supreme Court, and virtually all lower courts, have held that Justice Kennedy's 
opinion in Harmelin, as the opinion that concurred in the judgment reached but also recognized at least 
some degree of sentencing review under the Eighth Amendment, contains the ratio decidendi of the case. 
See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23-24 (plurality opinion); Henderson v. Norris, 258 F.3d 706, 709 (8th Cir. 2001) 
("apply[ing] the principles outlined in Mr. Justice Kennedy's opinion" in Harmelin); Hawkins v. Hargett, 
200 F.3d 1279, 282 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Harris, 154 F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 1998); 
Dressler, supra note 111, at 49.  See generally Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
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in assimilating the structure of noncapital proportionality review under the Eighth 
Amendment to that of Fourteenth Amendment rationality review.
Ronald Harmelin had no criminal record.  He was found in Detroit with 672
grams of cocaine and a variety of drug paraphernalia, and convicted of simple possession 
of illegal drugs in an amount greater than 650 grams.131  Under Michigan law, this 
offense carried a mandatory penalty of life imprisonment without possibility of parole –
the most severe punishment authorized in Michigan.132  Harmelin unsuccessfully sought 
relief in the state courts on the ground that his sentence was cruel and unusual.  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the sentence, five Justices to four.
Under Solem, Harmelin’s legal claim should have prevailed. Solem had expressly 
classified Helm’s convictions for drunk driving and nonresidential burglary as 
“nonviolent” offenses, treating them as relatively less serious than “violent” offenses.133
By this standard, Harmelin’s passive possession of contraband had at least as attenuated a 
connection to possible incidents of violence as Helm’s felonies. Moreover, while the 
Supreme Court in Davis had approved stiff sentences (well short of life  without parole) 
for individual counts of drug trafficking,134 Harmelin had not been charged with 
distribution of drugs, or even with possession with intent to distribute.135 He was a 
131 See id. at 961 & n.1 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.7403(2)(a)(i), 
333.7403(2)(a)(1) (West 1990-91)).
132 Id. at 1021 (White, J., dissenting).
133 See Solem, 463 U.S. at 279.
134 Davis, 454 U.S. at 375 (upholding twenty years for each of two counts of distributing marijuana and 
possessing with intent to distribute).
135
 Michigan, like most jurisdictions, separately criminalizes the possession of drugs with intent to 
distribute.  Under the state’s drug laws, simple possession above 650 grams then carried the same penalty 
(life without parole) as possession with intent to distribute.  Prosecutors deliberately chose to charge 
Harmelin with simple possession to ease their burden at trial.  See id. at 1025 (White, J., dissenting). 
34
simple possessor.  Nor could any interest in combating recidivism justify his punishment, 
as was true in Rummel: Harmelin was a first-time offender. Finally, Harmelin also had a 
powerful case under the two comparative factors announced in Solem.  The Michigan 
penal code punished Harmelin’s possessory offense more severely than rape, armed 
robbery or second degree murder;136 and Harmelin’s sentence was harsher than any that 
he could have received for his offense in another state.137  It is difficult to dispute that 
Harmelin’s sentence satisfied Solem's standard.138  And not one Justice claimed
otherwise. Instead, the five Justices who voted to affirm Harmelin’s sentence decided the 
case under different constitutional standards than those announced in Solem.
1. Justice Scalia’s Restatement of the Originalist Critique
Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court in an extensive opinion joined 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Rehnquist’s opinion in Rummel had tried to minimize the 
reach of Eighth Amendment proportionality review using pragmatic and case law-based 
arguments. Justice Scalia now reached back to fundamentals, arguing from text and 
history that Solem (and behind it, Weems) were “simply wrong: the Eighth Amendment 
136 Id. at 1025-26 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that all three of these offenses carried more lenient 
sentencing ranges than the mandatory life sentence for Harmelin’s crime).
137 Id. at 1026 (noting that the next harshest state, Alabama, imposed a mandatory life sentence without 
parole only upon conviction for possession of at least 10 kilograms of cocaine).
138 See Dressler, supra note 111, at 48 (Harmelin had a "strong case of unconstitutionality" under Solem); 
but see Woodburn, supra note 18, at 1940-42 (arguing that Harmelin’s sentence was constitutional under 
the Solem framework because of “the gravity of drug-related social problems,” especially given that he 
possessed cocaine in commercial quantities).  
Woodburn identifies utilitarian social concerns.  These certainly suggest why a rational legislature 
might decide in good faith to establish fierce mandatory punishments for first-time cocaine possession –
which would satisfy the modified constitutional standard that Justice Kennedy announced in Harmelin.  But 
Woodburn does not show how this reasoning could be reconciled with Solem’s original, broad conception 
of “nonviolent” crimes.  If repeated drunken driving is, as a matter of law, a “relatively minor” offense that 
is not a “crime against a person,” Solem, 463 U.S. at 297, how could one say with any confidence that the 
simple possession of a bag of contraband is sufficiently “grave” and "violent" to justify a life sentence 
without parole?  Harmelin’s result, while correct, was not legally compatible with the Solem opinion.   
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contains no proportionality principle.”139 Instead, in his view, the Eighth Amendment 
invalidates only "particular forms or 'modes' of punishment — specifically, cruel methods 
of punishment that are not regularly or customarily employed."140
Justice Scalia's originalist argument rested on three sources of evidence: the 
English history that gave rise to the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the 1689 
Bill of Rights; the history surrounding the Eighth Amendment's adoption in 1791; and 
nineteenth-century judicial interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.  
The first of these sources proved to give only equivocal support to Justice Scalia's
position.  As he recognized, the leading impetus for the 1689 clause was the conduct of 
the Court of King's Bench in the trial of Titus Oates and other prominent state trials.141
What prompted outrage, Scalia claimed, was the "arbitrary sentencing power" claimed by 
Chief Justice Jeffreys, who crafted special sentences to punish perceived enemies of the 
crown.142  The defect in Oates's sentence was that it involved punishments "out of the 
139 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965 (opinion of Scalia, J.).  It is curious that Justice Scalia's Harmelin opinion 
nowhere mentions its most prominent predecessor, Justice White's dissent in Weems.  The two opinions, 
eight decades apart, canvass virtually identical historical evidence and offer many of the same arguments.  
Compare Weems, 217 U.S. at 382-413 (White, J., dissenting) with Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 966-85 (opinion 
of Scalia, J.).  
Perhaps Justice Scalia was uncomfortable with Justice White's conclusion that, while the Eighth 
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause had no application to legislatively enacted penalties 
such as those before the Court in Weems, it might be applicable in some fashion to judge-imposed 
penalties.  See Weems, 217 U.S. at 397 (White, J., dissenting) (concluding that Eighth Amendment 
"restrain[s] the courts from exerting and Congress from empowering them, to select and exert by way of 
discretion modes of punishment which were not usual, or usual modes of punishment to a degree not usual, 
and which could alone be imposed by express authority of law."). 
140 Id. at 976.
141 Id. at 968-975.
142 Id. at 968.  Justice Scalia quoted Justice Withins's remark to Oates that "we have taken special care of 
you."  Id. at 970, quoting Second Trial of Titus Oates, 10 Howell's State Trials 1227, 1316 (K.B. 1685).
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Judges' Power."143  Some of the elements of Oates's sentence, such as defrocking, could 
only be administered by an ecclesiastical court.  Other punishments, such as prolonged 
scourging (indeed, the judges may have intended that Oates be scourged to death), were 
viewed as contrary to common law practice for misdemeanor offenses such as Oates's 
perjuries.144 The members of the House of Commons who sought (unsuccessfully) to 
overturn Oates's sentence were motivated by the judges' "Pretence to a discretionary 
Power" to "inflict what Punishment they pleased."145 In Justice Scalia's view, then, the 
furor over Oates's trial did not principally emphasize the extreme or disproportionate 
nature of the sanctions imposed, but rather the imposition of punishments not authorized 
by common law tradition or statute.146
At the same time, Justice Scalia obliquely acknowledged that none of the 
individual modes of punishment employed in Oates's sentence – defrocking, whipping, 
pillorying, fines, imprisonment  – were illegal at the time, and they were not prohibited
by statute for many years thereafter.147  Moreover, Justice Scalia's opinion quoted the 
dissenting minority of the House of Lords, who condemned Oates's sentence not only for
143 Id. at 973, quoting the dissenting report of the minority of the House of Lords, 1 H.L. JOUR. 367 (May 
31, 1689).
144 Id. at 971-72.
145 Id. at 973, quoting 10 H.C. JOUR. 247 (Aug. 2, 1689).
146 See Granucci, supra note 55, at 859 (concluding that "[i]n the context of . . . Oates's case, 'cruel and 
unusual' seems to have meant a severe punishment unauthorized by statute and not within the jurisdiction 
of the court to impose.").
147 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 968 (opinion of Scalia, J.); see Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth 
Amendment, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 143 (2004); Granucci, supra note 55, at 855 -56, 859 ("It is 
clear that no [blanket] prohibition on methods of punishment was intended" by the 1689 Bill of Rights).
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being "contrary to Law and ancient practice," but also as "barbarous, inhuman, and 
unchristian."148
Early American history more clearly supported Justice Scalia's view.  The few 
references in the ratification debates to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
viewed it as prohibiting torturous or barbarous punishments.149  Indeed, a leading 
scholarly treatment, cited extensively by Justice Scalia, concluded that the Framers were 
led by an "unjustified reading" of the English Bill of Rights provision to view the words 
"cruel and unusual" as "proscrib[ing] not excessive but torturous punishments."150
Justice Scalia also noted that the federal criminal code enacted by the first Congress, 
immediately contemporary with the adoption of the Eighth Amendment, did not seem to 
recognize a proportionality principle, as it provided for numerous harsh penalties, 
including death by hanging for counterfeiting government securities and for stealing fifty 
dollars worth of goods from a vessel.151
Finally, Justice Scalia examined early American case law interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment.  Most nineteenth century courts interpreted it as a limitation on the modes 
148 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 971 (opinion of Scalia, J.), quoting 1 H.L. JOUR. 367 (May 31, 1689).
149 Id. at 979-80.   Delegates to the 1788 Massachusetts convention objected that the new government was 
"nowhere restrained from inventing the most cruel and unheard-of punishments . . . and there is no 
constitutional check on [it], but that racks and gibbets may be amongst the most mild instruments of [its] 
discipline."  2 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 111 (2d ed. 1854).  Patrick Henry 
argued before the Virginia Convention that "your members of Congress will loose the restriction of not . . . 
inflicting cruel and unusual punishments.  What has distinguished our ancestors?  That they would not 
admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment." 3 Elliot, id., at 447.  George Mason reassured the 
Virginians that the federal Bill of Rights would prohibit torture because, like their own bill of rights, it 
provided, "that no cruel and unusual punishments shall be inflicted; therefore torture was included in the 
prohibition."  3 PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 1085 (R. Rutland ed. 1970); see generally Granucci, supra note 
55, at 839-42; Schwartz, supra note 80, at 382.
150
 Granucci, supra note 55, at 865; see Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 975, 979 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
151 Id. at 980-81, citing 1 Stat. 114-15 (1790).
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of bodily punishment the legislature could use, not on the proportionality of 
punishments.152
Justice Scalia's opinion also offered pragmatic criticism of the approach to 
judicial proportionality review suggested in Solem.  He contended that courts could not 
adequately administer a test that required them to gauge the "inherent gravity" of a given 
offense compared to other offenses,153 nor could they perform meaningful 
intrajurisdictional comparisons, because of the parallel difficulty of identifying which 
offenses are "similar" in gravity to a given offense.154  He concluded that "the 
proportionality principle becomes an invitation to imposition of subjective values."155
In closing, Justice Scalia acknowledged that the Court's modern death penalty 
jurisprudence did not conform to the rule that he  supported for noncapital cases like 
Harmelin's.156  The Court has engaged in robust "proportionality"  review, squarely so 
called, in the capital punishment field.157 Indeed, Justice Byron White's dissent in 
152 Id. at 982-85.
153 Id. at 987-88 (arguing that, with respect to the "gravity" of Harmelin's possession of a significant 
quantity of cocaine, "[t]he members of the Michigan Legislature, and not we, know the situation on the 
streets of Detroit.").
154 Id. at 988-89.  Justice Scalia acknowledged that the third factor endorsed in Solem, interjurisdictional 
comparisons of the punishment for a given offense in different jurisdictions, was properly administrable by 
courts.  However, he viewed this factor as of "no conceivable relevance to the Eighth Amendment."  Id. at 
989 ("That a State is entitled to treat with stern disapproval an act that other States punish with the mildest 
of sanctions follows a fortiori from the undoubted fact that a State may criminalize an act that other States 
do not criminalize at all. . . . Diversity not only in policy, but in the means of implementing policy, is the 
very raison d'etre of our federal system.").
155 Id. at 986.
156 Id. at 993-94.  
157 See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding death penalty for murder is unconstitutionally 
disproportionate when imposed on mildly mentally retarded defendant); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 
(1982) (death penalty is unconstitutionally disproportionate for felony murder without intent to kill); Coker 
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death penalty is unconstitutionally disproportionate for rape of an adult 
woman).
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Harmelin, though offering only a desultory response to Justice Scalia's arguments about 
the historical meaning of the Eighth Amendment,158 effectively criticized the tension that 
Scalia's position created between noncapital and capital cases.159 Justice Scalia stood on 
the position that proportionality was not "a generalizable aspect of Eighth Amendment 
law," but was "one of several respects in which we have held that 'death is different,' and 
have imposed protections that the Constitution nowhere else provides."160
2. Justice Kennedy’s Plurality Opinion
In the pivotal opinion in Harmelin, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O’Connor 
and Souter, concurred in part with Justice Scalia and concurred in the judgment, but 
parted ways with Justice Scalia's conclusion that the Court should entirely abandon the 
constitutional review of prison sentences.  Declining to take sides in the historical debate 
between Justices Scalia and White, Kennedy concluded that “stare decisis counsels our 
adherence to the narrow proportionality principle that has existed in our Eighth 
158
 Justice White pointed out that one nineteenth century commentator had stated that "it would seem that 
imprisonment for an unreasonable length of time" was contrary to "the spirit of the constitution."  
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1010 (White, J., dissenting), quoting B. OLIVER, THE RIGHTS OF AN AMERICAN 
CITIZEN 185-86 (1832).  Justice White also noted that at one point in his influential historical analysis of 
the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the English Bill of Rights, Anthony Granucci posited that the 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments included "a reiteration of the English policy against 
disproportionate penalties."  Id. at 1011 n.1, quoting Granucci, supra note 55, at 860.  However, as Justice 
Scalia pointed out, Granucci's conclusion on this score is difficult to explain in light of the rest of his 
analysis.  See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 975 n.5 (opinion of Scalia, J.).  
Granucci notes that the English penal law of the time authorized violent death and harsh bodily 
punishments for numerous offenses, and that, if anything, this tendency worsened in the eighteenth century 
after the adoption of the English Bill of Rights.  Granucci, supra note 55, at 855-56, 859.  He catalogs the 
actual objections to the proceedings in King's Bench which gave rise to the cruel and unusual punishments 
clause, and while there was an occasional leitmotif of objection to the severity of punishments imposed in 
the trial of Titus Oates and others, the principal objection was clearly to the legally unauthorized nature of 
the punishments inflicted.  Id. at 859.  Other commentators have also criticized Granucci's en passant 
historical argument for proportionality review.  See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 80, at 380-81.
159 Id. at 1012-14, 1018 (White, J, dissenting).
160 Id. at 994 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
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Amendment jurisprudence for 80 years."161 The plurality declined to overrule the 
holding of Weems that some noncapital sentences may violate the Eighth Amendment .162
However, it substantially reformulated the proportionality analysis of Solem, jettisoning 
Solem's standard of "significant disproportionality" and scaling back to a mode of review 
that would invalidate only rare sentences marked by grave disproportionality.
As defined by the Harmelin plurality, Eighth Amendment sentencing review has 
four salient characteristics.
1. Review is highly limited. Only "extreme sentences that are grossly 
disproportionate to the crime" violate the Eighth Amendment.163  The courts' review is 
"narrow," and thus easy for the state to satisfy.164  Indeed, the Harmelin plurality, in 
upholding Harmelin's life sentence for possession of hard drugs in commercial quantity, 
observed that "a rational basis exist[ed] for Michigan to conclude" that his crime was as 
serious as felony murder.  The plurality seemed to view this as sufficient to justify the 
sentence.165
2. Respect for moral diversity among jurisdictions. One of the plurality's most 
important conclusions was that "the Eighth Amendment does not mandate adoption of 
any one penological theory."166  Justice Kennedy identified the four basic goals of 
161 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996 (Kennedy, J.) (plurality opinion).
162 Id. at 997-98.
163 Id. at 1001.
164 Id. at 997.
165 Id. at 1004.
166 Id. at 999.
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criminal punishment — retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation 167 —
and acknowledged that the weight that different jurisdictions give to these principles has 
understandably "varied with the times."168  Eighth Amendment sentencing review, then, 
is not about ensuring a close conformity of the offense of conviction with the reviewing 
court's assessment of retributively proper punishment.  States may give strong weight to 
incapacitation and deterrence as well.169  This holding shed retrospective light on 
Rummel, and prospective light on the Court's later holding in Ewing, like Rummel a 
recidivism case.
3. A challenger must satisfy a significant initial burden before the court will 
engage in weighing evidence. Harmelin's clearest doctrinal departure from Solem was its 
refusal to apply to Harmelin's sentence the intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional 
comparisons that Solem had applied as a threshold matter.  Noting that Solem "appeared 
to apply a different analysis than in Rummel and Davis,"170 the plurality held that such 
comparisons "are appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the 
crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross 
disproportionality."171  If the court can inspect the sentence on its face and infer a 
167
 The federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which authorized the promulgation of the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines, identifies these as the four goals that underlie punishment in the federal justice system.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989); see also United States v. Booker, 
125 S.Ct. 738 (2005) (holding that federal courts are not bound by the federal sentencing guidelines, but 
must consider them in imposing sentence, and that departures from the guidelines must be reasonable).
168 Id., quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 819 (1991).
169 See id. (observing that "marked divergences both in underlying theories of sentencing and in the length 
of prescribed prison terms are the inevitable, often beneficial, result of the federal structure.").
170 Id. at 998.
171 Id. at 1005.  
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justification that renders it not grossly disproportionate, then the sentence is constitutional 
without further inquiry.172
4.  Attention to whether substantive outcomes suggest procedural defects. 
Harmelin involved a mandatory penalty of life without parole that the Michigan 
legislature had chosen for the precise conduct in which Harmelin engaged.  Unlike 
Solem, where Helm's harsh life sentence resulted from the almost completely unguided 
discretionary decision of a single trial judge, Harmelin thus involved the "collective 
wisdom of the Michigan Legislature and, as a consequence, the Michigan citizenry."173
Justice Kennedy's opinion gave weight to this factor as a basis for distinguishing Solem, 
stressing that "[w]e have never invalidated a penalty mandated by a legislature based only 
on the length of sentence," and "we should do so only in the most extreme 
circumstance."174  Yet this difference between Solem and Harmelin had to do strictly with 
the procedure that yielded the sentences in question.  The bottom line, life without 
parole, was identical in each case.175
The reader will, of course, have noticed that the four characteristics just described 
parallel the ones previously used to define Fourteenth Amendment rationality review.176
172 See id. ("In light of the gravity of petitioner's offense, a comparison of his crime with his sentence does 
not give rise to an inference of gross disproportionality, and comparative analysis of his sentence with 
others in Michigan and across the Nation need not be performed.").
173 Id. at 1006.
174 Id. at 1006-07.
175
 Others have noted that the holdings in Solem and Harmelin suggest that the Court gives weight to the 
distinction between penalties required by general legislation and those imposed as a result of unguided 
individual discretion.  See Pamela S. Karlan, “Pricking the Lines”: The Due Process Clause, Punitive 
Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880, 890 (2004) (arguing that "the central appeal of 
Helm's claim was that he was the victim of a draconian judge.").
176 See supra text accompanying notes 38 to 48.
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Despite its use of the language of "proportionality" review (or rather, "gross 
disproportionality" review), the Harmelin plurality is best read as assimilating the 
structure of Eighth Amendment sentencing review to that of general Fourteenth 
Amendment due process review.  The principle animating judicial review in each context 
is as much procedural as substantive, hence the differential treatment of mandatory 
legislative sentences and discretionary judge-imposed ones.  As long as the sentencing 
system in a given state is working properly and evenhandedly, Justice Kennedy's opinion 
suggests, the federal courts will almost never intervene on the basis of simple 
disagreement with a state's policy choices. Instead, the federal courts seek to identify 
individual arbitrary and capricious exercises of state power that suggest official abuse of 
the authority to punish.   
F. Ewing v. California: Rationality Review Revisited 
It may seem strange to speak of a splintered 2-3-4 decision as a source of relative 
stability in a troubled area of the law, but that is how Ewing v. California177 should be
viewed.  For the first time in over twenty years, the Supreme Court decided two 
successive Eighth Amendment sentencing cases under the same doctrinal framework.178
Both in words and in fact, the Ewing plurality adhered to and clarified the rational basis 
standard articulated by Justice Kennedy in Harmelin.
1. Background
177
 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
178
 If one limits the field to argued decisions (Davis was a summary reversal), and views Rummel as a legal 
departure from Weems, then the Court had never decided two successive noncapital sentencing cases under 
the same legal framework until Ewing followed Harmelin.
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Ewing arose from the application of California’s “Three Strikes and You’re Out” 
law, a tough recidivism statute adopted by legislation and popular referendum in 1994.179
The “Three Strikes” statutory scheme doubles the sentence of any felony offender who is 
found to have been convicted of one prior serious or violent felony.  For felony offenders 
with at least two serious or violent prior felonies, the statute mandates an indeterminate 
life sentence without the possibility of parole for at least 25 years, for each new felony 
conviction.180 When a two-time violent or serious offender is convicted of multiple 
felonies, each “third strike” produces a separate 25-to-life sentence, which must be served 
consecutively.181  The third, triggering strike can be any felony.182
The scheme, as interpreted by the state courts, incorporates the exercise of
prosecutorial and judicial discretion in several respects.  Trial courts may vacate 
allegations of qualifying prior strikes if they conclude that the circumstances do not 
justify subjecting the defendant to the Three Strikes scheme.183 In addition, some 
possible triggering offenses are “wobblers” – a prosecutor may charge them as either a 
felony or as a misdemeanor.  The latter choice places the defendant outside the Three 
Strikes scheme.  The trial court may also overrule a prosecutor’s decision to charge a 
179
 The original version of the “Three Strikes” statute was defeated in legislative committee in 1993.  
Supporters then introduced Proposition 184, a ballot initiative with similar content, which was adopted by a 
72% majority of voters in the November, 1994 election.  Meanwhile, the widely publicized murder of Polly 
Klaas energized legislative support for the original measure, and it too was enacted, in amended form, in 
March 1994.  Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§ 667(e), 1170.12(c) (2002); see Ewing, 538 U.S. at 15-17; Ardaiz, 
supra note 179, at 12.
180
 Cal. Penal Code Ann.§§ 667(e)(2)(A), 1170.12(c)(A) (2002).
181 Id.
182
 Cal. Penal Code §§ 667(e)(2)(A), 1170.12(c)(2)(A).
183 See People v. Williams, 163 P.2d 692, 696 (Cal. 1945); Ewing, 538 U.S. at 16-17 (plurality opinion).
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wobbler as a felony, which similarly removes a defendant from the statute’s reach.184
Finally, the trial court may choose to strike a defendant's earlier conviction for a serious 
or violent felony so as to avoid triggering the Three Strikes scheme.185
Gary Ewing received a Three Strikes sentence of 25 years to life when a 
California jury convicted him of felony grand theft.186  Ewing had stolen three golf clubs 
worth approximately $1200 from the pro shop of a Los Angeles golf course.187  Ewing’s
substantial criminal history included four prior felony convictions arising from a 
residential burglary and robbery spree in 1993, as well as seven misdemeanors, including 
convictions for burglary, battery, theft, and drug possession.188
Ewing's Eighth Amendment challenge to his conviction was rejected in the 
California appellate courts.189  The Supreme Court took the case on direct review.  
Ewing’s sentence presented a test of the scope of the holdings in both Harmelin, the 
Court's last prison sentencing case, and Solem, its last recidivism case.  Ewing’s 
triggering offense (grand theft) was more serious than the minor fraud at issue in Solem.
His sentence (parole available after 25 years) was lighter than the sentence of life without 
184
 Cal. Penal Code §§ 17(b)(1), 17(b)(5).
185 People v. Williams, 948 P.2d 429, 437 (Cal. 1998).
186 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 19-20 (plurality opinion).  More precisely, the mandatory sentence for a "third 
strike" is an "indeterminate life sentence," for which the offender is eligible for parole in 25 years, or three 
times the default parole eligibility term for his offense, or the term of the underlying conviction itself, 
including enhancements — whichever is greater.  Cal. Penal Code §§ 667(e)(2)(A)(i) – (iii); 
1170.12(c)(2)(A)(i)-(iii).  Ewing's offense entailed parole eligibility in 25 years.  Ewing, 538 U.S. at 20 
(plurality opinion).
187 Id. at 17-18.
188 Id. at 18-19.  Ewing awakened one of his victims while burglarizing her apartment, then threatened her 
with a knife, sending her fleeing from the apartment screaming for help.  Id. 
189 People v. Ewing, No. B-143745 (Cal. App. Apr. 25, 2001).
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parole struck down in Solem. His past criminal record, which included armed robbery 
and home burglary, was also more severe than Helm’s.  
The Court rejected Ewing’s Eighth Amendment claim.  No opinion gathered a 
majority of Justices.  The governing opinion was Justice O’Connor’s, which spoke for a 
three-Justice plurality.190  This opinion, when read together with Justice Scalia’s 
analytically interesting separate concurrence, furthered the process begun in Harmelin of 
articulating a viable standard for the constitutional review of sentencing.  The California 
Attorney General's brief in Ewing asked the Supreme Court to hold in so many words that 
the Eighth Amendment requires a "rational basis" for sentencing.191  While not 
employing that precise phrase, Justice O'Connor's opinion gave California, in substance, 
what it had requested.
2. The Plurality Opinion
Justice O'Connor took the Harmelin plurality opinion to govern Ewing's case.192
She reiterated the key formulations of rationality review that appeared in Harmelin:
review of prison sentences is "narrow"193; courts must respect the "primacy of the 
190 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 14-31 (plurality opinion).  Justice Kennedy, author of the Harmelin plurality, and 
Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Justice O'Connor's opinion. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's vote in Ewing reflected a shift from his position in Harmelin, when he 
had concurred in Justice Scalia's originalist argument that the Eighth Amendment authorizes no review of 
the magnitude of prison sentences at all.  See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965 et seq. (opinion of Scalia, J., joined 
by Rehnquist, C.J.).  One may speculate that Chief Justice Rehnquist believed that the Harmelin plurality 
opinion was sufficiently justifiable to be entitled to stare decisis effect, even though he declined to join it in 
the first instance.  See Van Cleave, supra note 13, at 227 (noting this apparent shift in view); cf. Dickerson 
v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (declining to overrule Miranda v. Arizona, in a 
majority opinion whose analysis focused heavily on the value of stare decisis rather than on Miranda's 
correctness as an original matter).
191
 Brief for Respondent, No. 01-6978, Ewing v. California (U.S. 2003).
192 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23-24 ("The proportionality principles in our cases distilled in Justice Kennedy's 
[Harmelin] concurrence guide our application of the Eighth Amendment in the new context that we are 
called upon to consider.").
193 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 20 (plurality opinion).
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legislature" and the "federal system"194; the Eighth Amendment "does not mandate 
adoption of any one penological theory"195; and Solem's intrajurisdictional and 
interjurisdictional comparison factors do not become relevant except in "the rare case" in 
which a threshold review of the crime and sentence gives rise to an inference of gross 
disproportionality.196
Justice O'Connor made clear that, under Harmelin, a court reviewing a sentence 
imposed under a recidivism statute is to consider the rationality of the individual sentence 
in light of the rationality of the sentencing scheme as a whole.  She emphasized that not 
only retribution, but also incapacitation, deterrence, and rehabilitation "may play a role in 
a State's sentencing scheme."197  Likewise, when considering the justifiability of the 
individual sentence, a court must consider how retribution and incapacitation and 
deterrence may each contribute to rationalizing the sentence.
In explaining the plurality's review of Ewing's individual sentence,  Justice 
O'Connor introduced some obscurity by stating that she began by weighing "the gravity 
of Ewing's offense."  This phrase, which originated in Solem,198 suggests a focus on the 
inherent retributive severity of Ewing's grand theft ("standing alone," as Justice O'Connor 
put it).  But the Ewing plurality actually held that the "gravity" of Ewing's offense could 
not be assessed without taking into account "his long history of felony recidivism" and 
194 Id. at 23.
195 Id. at 25.
196 Id. at 30.
197 Id. at 25.
198 Solem, 463 U.S. at 292 (one of three factors considered in proportionality review should be "the gravity 
of the offense and the harshness of the penalty").
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thus "the State's public- safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons."199
It would be error, Justice O'Connor indicated, to fail to give "full effect to the State's 
choice of th[ese] legitimate penological goal[s]."200
It seems more natural to say that the Ewing plurality engaged in a threshold 
review of the overall rationality of Ewing's sentence.  Comparing Ewing's sentence and 
statutory scheme with his record and offense of conviction, the Court plurality concluded 
that the sentence rationally furthered a sentencing scheme that was adopted in a good 
faith attempt to lower California's crime rate:
To be sure, Ewing's sentence is a long one.  But it reflects a rational legislative 
judgment, entitled to deference, that offenders who have committed serious or
violent felonies and who continue to commit felonies must be incapacitated.201
The plurality thus held the sentence constitutional at the threshold stage, and did 
not go on to consider whether Ewing's sentence was comparable to those imposed for 
similar offenses in California or in other jurisdictions.202
The plurality opinion was not devoid of empirical analysis.  Justice O'Connor 
noted that recidivism is "a serious public safety concern" in California.203  In an 
interesting passage, she opined that California's "justification" for the Three Strikes "is no 
pretext."204  She also discussed evidence suggesting that the Three Strikes law had led to 
a decline in the recidivism rate of parolees in California.  Other evidence suggested that 
199 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 29 (plurality opinion).
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 30.
202 Id. at 30-31. 
203 Id. at 26.
204 Id.
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parolees were actually emigrating from the state to avoid running afoul of the Three 
Strikes law.205
3. Justice Scalia's Criticism of the Harmelin Standard
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment.206  He did not join the plurality’s 
reasoning, but voted to affirm Ewing’s sentence on the basis of the position he had 
adopted in Harmelin: the Eighth Amendment does not authorize constitutional review of 
prison sentences.207 Justice Scalia’s opinion included a number of interesting
observations on the plurality’s use of Harmelin's rational basis standard.
Justice Scalia defended his continued refusal to accept Eighth Amendment review 
of prison sentences on the ground that the proportionality inquiry developed in Solem and 
refined in subsequent cases could not be "intelligibly appl[ied]” by judges.208 Far from 
205 Id. at 27.
206
 Justice Thomas also concurred separately in the judgment in a brief opinion.  He explicitly endorsed 
Justice Scalia’s originalist critique in Harmelin and concluded that “the Eighth Amendment contains no 
proportionality principle.”  Id. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).  It followed that Ewing’s 
sentence was constitutional.  In fact, Justice Thomas expressed a stronger commitment to the originalist 
critique that Justice Scalia did.  While Thomas agreed that “the … test announced in Solem … is incapable 
of judicial application,” he added pointedly that “[e]ven were Solem’s test perfectly clear, … I would not 
feel compelled by stare decisis to apply it,” implying that in his view Solem (and presumably Weems) are 
plainly mistaken.  Id.
This subtle disagreement between the two originalist Justices highlights Justice Thomas’s 
signature refusal to give stare decisis effect to precedents that he views as unsupported by the 
Constitution’s text and history.   See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 677-680 & n.4 (2002) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (questioning whether the Court’s Establishment Clause doctrines should continue 
to be applied against the states); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 521, 528 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(expressing a willingness to “reevaluat[e] … in an appropriate case” the meaning of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court should “temper” its post-New Deal Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence); see also Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 23 (1994) (offering a short, blunt argument that the Supremacy Clause bars federal courts from 
granting stare decisis effect to horizontal precedents in constitutional cases, implying a jurisprudence 
similar to Justice Thomas’s).
207 Id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and 
unusual punishments’ was aimed at excluding only certain modes of punishment, and was not a guarantee 
against disproportionate sentences.”) (punctuation omitted).
208 Id. 
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embracing (as Chief Justice Rehnquist apparently did) Harmelin and Ewing's revision of 
Solem, Scalia contended that the Ewing plurality's analysis "demonstrate[d]" the 
untenability of sentencing review:
Proportionality – the notion that the punishment should fit the crime – is 
inherently a concept tied to the penological goal of retribution. … In the 
present case, the game is up once the plurality has acknowledged that “the 
Constitution does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory,” 
and that a “sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as 
incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.”  That 
acknowledgment having been made, it no longer suffices merely to assess 
the gravity of the offense compared to the harshness of the penalty; that 
classic description of the proportionality principle (alone and in itself quite 
resistant to policy-free, legal analysis) now becomes merely the first step 
of the inquiry.209
In effect, Justice Scalia asserted that the move from Solem to Harmelin rendered 
Eighth Amendment scrutiny less tractable, not more so.
Perhaps the plurality should revise its terminology, so that what it reads 
into the Eighth Amendment is not the unstated proposition that all 
punishment that all punishment should be reasonably proportionate to the 
gravity of the offense, but rather the unstated proposition that all 
punishment should reasonably pursue the multiple purposes of the 
criminal law.  That formulation would make it clearer than ever, of course, 
that the plurality is not applying law but evaluating policy.210
Justice Scalia's criticisms appear misguided in two ways.  He writes as though Harmelin
replaced Solem’s substantive proportionality review with a kind of generalized 
intermediate scrutiny (for “reasonab[ility]”) in which federal judges were to scrutinize the 
209 Id. at 31 (punctuation and citations omitted).
210 Id. at 31.  Both dissenting Justices and commentators have expressed criticisms of Ewing and Harmelin
similar to Justice Scalia's.  See id. at 42 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("A threshold test that blocked every 
ultimately invalid constitutional claim — even strong ones — would not be a threshold test but a 
determinative test. . . . Sentencing comparisons are particularly important because they provide 
proportionality review with objective content.  By way of contrast, a threshold test makes the assessment of 
constitutionality highly subjective.") (emphasis in original); Van Cleave, supra note 13, at 230 ("Justice 
Kennedy's concurring opinion in Harmelin . . . does not meaningfully contribute to th[e] analysis. . . . [T]he 
Harmelin approach is as subjective as one could get."). 
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balancing of means and ends in each state’s penal code. If that description were right, it 
would indeed be cause for alarm, but Justice Scalia has not accurately identified the 
standard described or deployed in Harmelin.  On balance, Harmelin does not require 
reasonability in sentencing, only rationality.211 Second, given that a rational connection 
to a permissible sentencing goal is all that is required, Harmelin and Ewing's broadening 
of the permissible bases for a sentence weighs strictly in the direction of reducing the 
courts’ discretion to intervene, not increaasing it, just as a switch from intermediate 
Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny (which requires legislation to rest on an “important” 
state interest) to rationality scrutiny (which allows any “legitimate” interest to justify the 
statute) does not broaden a reviewing court’s discretion, but narrows it. Certainly Justice 
Scalia and other critics of similar views have not suggested why judicial sentencing 
review under the narrow Ewing-Harmelin standard is any more intractable or suspect 
than the general practice of judicial rationality review of statutes under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which it so intimately resembles. 
211
 There are sparse references to "reasonableness" in Ewing and Harmelin, but they are promptly undercut 
with subsequent language suggesting greater deference, e.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28 (plurality opinion) ("It 
is enough that the State of California has a reasonable basis for believing that dramatically enhanced 
sentences for habitual felons 'advanc[e] the goals of its criminal justice system in any substantial way.'") 
(quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 297 n.22); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004 (plurality opinon) ("Michigan could 
with good reason concude that petitioner's crime is more serious than the crime in Davis.  Similarly, a 
rational basis exists for Michigan to conclude that petitioner's crime is as serious and violent as the crime of 
felony murder . . . ").  
These remarks are heavily outweighed by the repeated references to rationality review in both 
opinions.  See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23 (plurality opinion) (holding that only "extreme" sentences are invalid); 
id. at 24 (noting Court's "tradition of defer[ence]" to States); id. at 25 (holding that sentencing rationales are 
"generally a policy choice to be made by state legislatures, not federal courts"); id. at 28 (affirming, in 
language borrowed from Fourteenth Amendment case law, that the Court "do[es] not sit as a 
'superlegislature'" in reviewing sentences); id. at 29 (holding California statute serves a "legitimate 
penological goal"); id. at 30 (holding Ewing's sentence valid because it implements "a rational legislative 
judgment, entitled to deference"); accord Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998 (holding that "substantive penological 
judgments" are generally "within the province of legislatures, not courts"); id. at 1000 (noting that 
"differing attitudes and local conditions may yield different, yet rational, conclusions regarding the 
appropriate length of prison terms for particular crimes"); id. (invoking Justice Holmes's Lochner dissent); 
id. at 1001 (only "extreme" sentences are invalid); id. at 1004 (holding that Harmelin's sentence is 
supported by "a rational basis").
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4. Consequences
Ewing yielded a configuration of opinions identical to Harmelin: two Justices 
denying the existence of Eighth Amendment noncapital sentencing review and denying 
the petitioner's claim, three concurring Justices acknowledging the narrow review of the 
Harmelin concurrence but rejecting the petitioner's claim, and four dissenting Justices 
urging broad Eighth Amendment review and arguing that the petitioner's claim should 
have prevailed. The rule of Marks entails that the three-Justice Ewing plurality binds 
lower courts as the governing opinion of the Supreme Court.212
In the next section, I offer a normative defense of the mode of analysis in Ewing 
and Harmelin. Before passing to this task, I suggest that the plurality's result in Ewing
was clearly correct, even before turning to questions of theoretical jurisprudence.  Ewing 
was not a hard case, as long as one grants the premise that Ewing's recidivism – and thus 
the complete legislative judgment that yielded his sentence – deserves to be given weight 
in evaluating the propriety of his sentence.  Ewing was a much worse recidivist than 
Rummel or Helm.  He had felony convictions for armed robbery (at knifepoint) and three 
separate residential burglaries, clearly violent crimes, as well as a misdemeanor battery 
and a brace of various minor convictions for theft, drugs, and illegal firearms possession.  
In racking up his extensive criminal record, he was a repeated beneficiary of sentences 
that imposed only short terms of imprisonment followed by probation; California did not 
impose its harsh sentence upon Ewing until after extending leniency to him, repeatedly, 
212 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court decides a case and no 
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be 
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds 
. . . .") (quotation marks omitted); but cf. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 36 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that, "for 
present purposes," dissenters would analyze Ewing's Eighth Amendment claim under the Harmelin
plurality opinion); id. at 32-33 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that "it is not clear that this case is 
controlled by Harmelin," which did not deal with a recidivist offender).
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over a period of years, in the hope that he would reform.  Nor was the offense that 
triggered Ewing's 25-to-life sentence, grand theft, a trivial or highly passive one.  A 
number of commentators have described Ewing as a case about "shoplifting."213
However, the golf clubs Ewing tried to steal were worth almost $1200.214  This is a more 
serious property offense than the sort of small theft ordinarily associated with the word 
"shoplifting."  While $1200 may seem a modest sum to the average appellate lawyer or 
federal judge, to the median working American it is nearly half a month's pay, before
taxes.215 This sum is by no means minor.216  Moreover, California could surely have 
constitutionally punished Ewing with 25 years imprisonment for his earlier armed 
robbery or his burglary spree alone.217 Having instead chosen to impose a milder 
punishment for those serious crimes, the state should not be foreclosed from imposing 
heightened consequences on Ewing — in effect, revisiting its earlier mercy — when he 
spurned the chance to reform his conduct.  
III. THE CASE FOR RATIONALITY REVIEW OF PRISON SENTENCES
Under Ewing and Harmelin, a sentence that reflects a "rational legislative 
judgment" and furthers a "legitimate penological goal" will be allowed to stand, 
213 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, supra note 18, at 1059.
214 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18 (plurality opinion).
215 See U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, 
Money Income in the United States: 1999 (median annual income for all persons 25 or over is roughly 
$31,000).
216 See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28 (plurality opinion) ("Even standing alone, Ewing's theft should not be taken 
lightly.").
217 Cf. Davis, 454 U.S. at 375 (upholding a sentence of 20 years for each of two counts of marijuana 
trafficking).
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particularly when there is no suggestion that the claimed motive is a "pretext" for an 
illegitimate motive.  This is the language of Fourteenth Amendment due process review 
under Carolene Products and its progeny.  The Court's swing Justices have exported the 
rationality standard from a general context to a specific one: from its original home in the 
review of statutes to the review of individual dispositions of government power in the 
form of criminal sentences.  
Ewing and Harmelin got it right. The proper legal meaning of "c ruel and 
unusual" in the context of prison sentencing is arbitrary and capricious, and Eighth 
Amendment review should be sensitive to whether a supposedly arbitrary sentence is one 
that is mandated by statute, or was instead imposed by a single judge or jury.218  This 
view, rationality review, is preferable to substantive review, the intrusive level of 
appellate sentencing review contemplated by the Solem opinion and the Ewing dissenters.  
It is also preferable to Justices Scalia and Thomas's view that the Eighth Amendment has 
no application to the magnitude of sentences of imprisonment — which I will follow 
Laurence Claus in calling vicious methods review.219
218
 For a compelling recent example of the sort of vindictive discretionary sentence barred by the Ewing-
Harmelin standard, see State v. David D.W., 588 S.E.2d 156, 165-66 (W.Va. 2003), where the court held 
that a sentence of 1,140 to 2,660 years for 38 incidents of sexual abuse (with the same victim) violated the 
Eighth Amendment and the corresponding provision of the West Virginia constitution.  The statutory 
scheme gave the trial judge essentially unlimited discretion to fashion the millenia-long sentence, by 
choosing to sentence the defendant consecutively for each count of conviction.   
David D.W. displays in a particularly clear fashion the quasi-procedural, due process-like function 
of Eighth Amendment sentencing review argued for in this Article.  The case dealt with an unquestionably 
grave and reprehensible crime.  The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals made plain that it considered 
the defendant's crimes "heinous and repulsive," id. at 166, and one concurring judge specifically indicated 
that he would have considered a traditional life sentence to be appropriate.  Id. at 166-67 (Maynard, J., 
concurring).  Since no one can serve longer than life in prison, the astronomical sentence struck down in 
David D.W. would have been no worse in substantive effect than a sentence that Justice Maynard, and
perhaps other justices, would have been perfectly willing to uphold.  Thus the result in David D.W. can 
only be explained as resulting from an inference of procedural defect arising from the extraordinary quality 
of the sentence.
219
 Claus, supra note 147, at 120.
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A. Stare Decisis
Part II's analysis showed that the conception of Eighth Amendment prison 
sentencing review as rationality review is currently the law of the land, as supplied by the 
plurality opinions in Harmelin and Ewing. It is also the "best fit" interpretation from the 
standpoint of stare decisis, fitting the totality of the Supreme Court's case law more 
closely than rival interpretations.  The rationality-review interpretation preserves the 
bedrock holding of Solem that some sentences violate the constitution.  It also preserves 
the holdings of Rummel, Harmelin and Ewing, which entail that constitutional review of 
state sentencing is highly limited.  As such, the rationality interpretation benefits from the 
presumption of correctness conferred by stare decisis, which is a point in its favor not 
enjoyed by the "vicious methods" interpretation endorsed by Justices Scalia and Thomas.  
Justice Scalia has himself acknowledged that stare decisis considerations are
relevant to originalist judging. 220  His principal argument against extending stare decisis 
recognition to the principle of Eighth Amendment review of prison sentences has been 
that the principle cannot be "intelligently appl[ied]."221 However, as explained in Part 
II.F.3 above, Justice Scalia's objection appears to rest on a misidentification of the 
standard imposed by Ewing and Harmelin.  The standard is not a general reasonableness 
requirement, it only requires the more limited inquiry characteristic of Fourteenth 
220
 Justice Scalia has written: 
Originalism, like any other theory of interpretation put into practice in an ongoing system of law, 
must accommodate the doctrine of stare decisis; it cannot remake the world anew . . . [S]tare 
decisis is not part of my originalist philosophy; it is a pragmatic exception to it.
SCALIA, supra note 53, at 38-40.
221 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 31 (Scalia, J, concurring in the judgment); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 984-85 (opinion of 
Scalia, J.).
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Amendment rationality review.222  Surely rationality review of sentences is at least as 
tractable as rationality review of general legislation.223  If Justice Scalia is not prepared to 
abandon Fourteenth Amendment rationality review in general as incapable of judicial 
application, then it is hard to see why he is unwilling to give stare decisis effect to the 
Harmelin-Ewing standard.
B. Text and History
The Constitution does not prohibit "excessive punishments," as it prohibits 
"excessive fines" and "excessive bail."224  It does not even prohibit "cruel punishments,"
as some state constitutions did at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted.225  It only 
outlaws punishments that are "cruel and unusual."226
In recent cases dealing with matters outside the context of prison sentencing, the 
Supreme Court has veered away from attention to the text of the Eighth Amendment.  It 
must unfortunately be said that some of the Court's most exuberant recent opinions have
crossed a line to actual misrepresentation of the text.  Justice Stevens has written: "The 
Eighth Amendment succinctly prohibits 'excessive' sanctions" — complete with 
222 See supra text accompanying notes 206 to 211.
223
 In fact, it is probably more tractable.  In the context of criminal sentencing, the universe of "legitimate 
state interests" that can justify a sentence is numerically limited in a way that does not appear to be true of 
the legitimate state interests that might support a piece of legislation.  Penologists traditionally identify four 
goals of criminal punishment.  See, e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999 (plurality opinion) ("The federal and 
state criminal systems have accorded different weights at different times to the penological goals of 
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation."). The federal sentencing guidelines reflect the 
same taxonomy of interests.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).   While judges, legislators and scholars may and 
do disagree powerfully on the weight to be given to these different interests in different contexts, the 
existence of a relatively noncontroversial catalog of legitimate interests suggests, again, that rationality 
review of sentences is at least as tractable as rationality review of legislation — which few seek to discard.
224 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
225 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 977 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (citing N.H. Bill of Rights, art. XVIII (1784) 
("cruel or unusual punishments"). 
226 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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quotation marks — in a criminal case in which the only provision of the Eighth 
Amendment at issue was the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, which does not
contain the word "excessive."227 Fortunately, the Court has so far avoided asserting this 
fiction in any of its governing opinions in the Harmelin line of cases, so that its future 
decisions in this area, as well as the work of lower courts, litigants and commentators, are 
less constrained by ill-considered dicta of this nature than in other contexts.
At what might be called the level of naïve textualism, rationality review comports 
better with the constitutional text than a mode of review that simply searches for
"excessive" punishments.  "A [merely] disproportionate punishment can perhaps always 
be considered 'cruel,' but it will not always be (as the text also requires) 'unusual.'"228
Just so.  Yet a harsh sentence that lacks a "rational basis," one that appears to reflect 
official caprice or vindictiveness, is unusual.  
At a more sophisticated originalist level, the legislative history of the Eighth 
Amendment and the corresponding provision of the English Bill of Rights gives virtually 
no support to the substant ive review position,229 but is more consistent with the 
rationality review position.  The key abuse targeted by the English provision was the 
exercise of "arbitrary sentencing power" by judges who crafted extreme and vindictive 
penalties in particular cases.  Cruel and unusual punishments were those that were 
227
 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. at 311.  It is, again, the use of quotation marks that is remarkable.  See 
Claus, supra note 147, at 120 ("If th[e] text were meant simply to condemn excessive punishment, why 
does it not say so?  The term 'excessive' was, after all, on the tip of the drafters' tongues, for they used it in 
respect to bail and fines.").
228 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 967 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
229 See generally the discussions of the Weems dissent and Justice Scalia's Harmelin opinion in Part II, 
supra text accompanying notes 73 to 78, 139 to 160; Claus, supra note 147, at 121 ("The [Eighth] 
Amendment was meant to address a problem distinct from either excessive punishment or vicious 
punishment.  That problem was discriminatory punishment."); Schwartz, supra note 80, at 380-82.  
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"immorally discriminatory in the direction of greater severity."230  The basic objection to 
such proceedings is captured in Justice Withins's recorded remark to Titus Oates in 
handing down Oates's imaginatively ferocious sentence – "we have taken special care of 
you."  It is not much of a stretch to imagine the South Dakota judge in State v. Helm
making the same remark to Jerry Helm before sentencing him to life without parole for 
passing a bad check, under a recidivist statute that gave essentially no guidance to the 
judge's sentencing discretion.231 One can likewise imagine the Arkansas jury in a key 
Eighth Circuit case, Henderson v. Norris, channeling Justice Withins and Chief Justice 
Jeffreys as they chose to sentence Grover Henderson to life without parole (at the top of a 
similarly open-ended sentencing range) for his first criminal offense: delivering less than 
one quarter of a gram of cocaine base.232 The Michigan legislature, by contrast, did not
"tak[e] special care" of Ronald Harmelin: it had decided in advance that the possession of 
commercial quantities of cocaine merited a mandatory penalty of life imprisonment
without parole, and that is what Harmelin got.233
C. Political Process Values
In a thoughtful critique of Harmelin and other facets of the Supreme Court's 
"proportionality" jurisprudence, Adam Gershowitz has argued that prison sentencing 
should receive heightened federal constitutional review because "criminal defendants" are 
230
 Claus, supra note 147, at 122.
231 See Solem, 463 U.S. at 281-83; Karlan, supra note 175.
232
 258 F.3d 706 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that Henderson's sentence violated the Eighth Amendment 
standard of the Harmelin plurality).
233 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961 n.1 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
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"a discrete and insular minority that will be prejudiced by the political process."234 While 
Harmelin and Ewing effectively liken state prison sentences to the catch- all "regulatory 
legislation" category of the Carolene Products Fourteenth Amendment framework, 
Gershowitz's language suggests the view that they are more analogous to the "special" 
class of laws disadvantaging discrete and insular minorities, which receive "more 
searching judicial inquiry."235
Gershowitz notes accurately that convicted felons generally cannot vote,236 and 
states that “criminal defendants” are politically unpopular.237 He admits that courts have 
routinely refused to hold criminal defendants a protected class for equal protection 
purposes,238 but relies upon John Hart Ely's widely discussed defense of a 
"representation-reinforcing" approach to constitutional adjudication in his Democracy 
and Discontent.239
In framing his political process argument, however, Gershowitz has subtly
misstated the issue.  The relevant societal class for purposes of deciding the desirability 
(as a policy matter) of intrusive judicial review of prison sentences is not criminal
defendants; rather, it is convicted criminals.  In fact, from the standpoint of the Eighth 
Amendment, only the class of criminal defendants who have been duly convicted after a 
procedurally proper trial is ordinarily at issue.  For if a constitutional defect had afflicted 
234 Gershowitz, supra note 13, at 1301.
235 Cf. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 & n.4.
236
 Gershowitz, supra note 13, at 1298-99.
237 Id. at 1299-1300.
238 Id. at 1301 n.269, citing Prisoners' Rights, 84 GEO. L.J. 1465, 1494 n.2975 (1996) (collecting cases).
239
 Ely, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 27, at 88.
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the guilt phase of a defendant's trial, then presumably his conviction would have been 
vacated without regard to the magnitude of his subsequent sentence; a court would not 
need to consider whether the sentence was excessive.  
Once this distinction is cleared up, the notion that Eighth Amendment claimants, 
duly convicted of crime, should be regarded as a discrete and insular minority entitled to 
protections not authorized by the text of the Constitution is unpersuasive.  Membership in 
the class does not involve an immutable characteristic of individuals240; one can avoid 
being a member by not committing crimes. And unlike the treatment of criminal suspects
— who are subject to a presumption of innocence, and who may be unable to exercise 
any meaningful control over whether the “characteristic” of being suspected applies to 
them241 — the very different “characteristic” of being legitimately guilty of criminal 
conduct is properly viewed as inherently undesirable.  It is a valid basis for 
“discrimination."
D. Neutral Interpretation 
Viewing the Supreme Court's noncapital sentencing cases over the past 25 years 
through the lens of rationality review is also advantageous from the standpoint of 
institutional legitimacy.  The Court has sometimes spoken of “deferring” to legislatures 
in the context of Eighth Amendment noncapital review. Such rhetoric, however, is 
troubling from a standpoint of textualism and of neutral jurisprudence.  Ceteris paribus,
and given identical data, an interpretation according to which the Court is fairly applying 
240 Cf. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4 (protected minorities must be "discrete and insular").
241 See William Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 20 
(1996) (opining that “the universe of criminal suspects” is a prime example of a “grou[p] that find[s] it hard 
or impossible to protect [itself] through the political process”).
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a principle supplied by the Constitution is surely to be preferred to one in which it is 
applying a principle only grudgingly or waveringly.  One may say that legislatures have a 
general authority to define crimes (as they do to set penalties for them) but when those 
definitions impinge on the Constitution’s textual guarantee of freedom of speech, for 
example, one rarely hears talk of courts “deferring” to the legislature in gauging whether 
a First Amendment violation has occurred.242  Likewise, in First Amendment analysis it 
makes no difference whether the challenged state action was brought about by a single
government decisionmaker (such as a judge or jury imposing damages in a libel case 
against a public figure)243 or is the considered judgment of the whole legislature (such as 
a statute prohibiting sedition)244; yet, as previously discussed, this does seem to matter in 
the Eighth Amendment prison cases. If the evil at which the cruel and unusual 
punishments clause is targeted is simply "disproportionate" punishments, it is not obvious 
why courts should “defer” to the legislature at all in deciding whether that constitutional 
guarantee has been infringed.  Yet the Court’s Eighth Amendment opinions do suggest 
that judge-made discretionary sentences deserve tougher scrutiny than sentences 
mandated by a legislature.245  Courts that pick and choose in such a fashion make 
themselves vulnerable to troubling criticism.246
242 See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1961) (adopting a balancing 
approach to First Amendment adjudication, but conceding that the First Amendment's guarantee is 
"absolute" in at least "the undoubted sense that where the constitutional protection exists it must prevail").
243 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
244 See Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (overturning conviction for attempting to incite 
insurrection).
245 See, e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1006-07 (plurality opinion).
246
 The best known contemporary example is Judge Alex Kozinski's dissent from the denial of rehearing en 
banc in the Second Amendment case of Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567, 568 (9th Cir. 2003): 
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The fact that the Court defers in these various ways in noncapital Eighth 
Amendment cases should lead us to conclude that the cruel and unusual punishments 
clause is targeting a different evil than mere harshness per se.  Instead, as has been argued 
in this Article, it should be understood as a quasi-procedural guarantee against abuse of 
the authority to fix punishments.  Usurpatious or arbitrary or spiteful prison sentences 
are cruel and unusual.
E. Federalism 
The Supreme Court has described the definition and enforcement of criminal law 
as a field "where States historically have been sovereign,"247 and the fixing of 
punishments for crimes as "peculiarly a question of legislative policy."248  Modes of 
judicial review of sentencing that preserve the states' independence in this area are not 
only consistent with tradition, but are likely to produce normatively beneficial results.  It 
has even been argued that federalism is "likely to be more important to the liberty and 
well being of the American people than any other structural feature of our Constitution, 
including the separation of powers, the Bill of Rights, and judicial review."249
Allowing the states latitude in choosing among different penological theories 
creates opportunities for each state to learn from the experiences of others.  The tough 
It is wrong to use some constitutional provisions as springboards for major social change while 
treating others like senile relatives to be cooped up in a nursing home until they quit annoying us. 
Expanding some to gargantuan proportions while discarding others like a crumpled gum wrapper 
is not faithfully applying the Constitution; it’s using our power as federal judges to 
constitutionalize our personal preferences.
247
 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
248
 Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958).
249
 Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States 
v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 756 (1995).  Calabresi's article contains one of the classic statements of 
the "normative case for federalism" to be found in the legal academic literature.  See id. at 756-790.
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California "Three Strikes" statute in Ewing v. California provided a significant example 
of such experimentation.  As Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion noted, evidence 
suggested that the California statute had produced a decrease in recidivism and an exodus 
of felons from the state.250  The plurality in Harmelin similarly viewed Michigan's 
adoption of a mandatory life sentence for possession of commercial quantities of cocaine 
as a rational experiment designed to combat serious social maladies caused by drugs.251
Standard pro-federalism arguments based on accountability and responsiveness 
also support the rule of Ewing and Harmelin.  An approach that allows states to display a
good deal of moral diversity in fixing crimes and punishments is more likely to yield a 
penal code that accords with local conditions and local moral beliefs.252  Justice Scalia
put the point concretely in Harmelin by contending that "the members of the Michigan 
Legislature, and not we, know the situation on the streets of Detroit."253
250 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 27 (plurality opinion); see generally Ardaiz, supra note 179.
251 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1008 ("Reasonable minds may differ about the efficacy of Michigan's sentencing 
scheme, and it is far from certain that Michigan's bold experiment will succeed.").  Justice Kennedy also 
cited Justice Brandeis's famous dictum on the role of the states as laboratories:
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation.  It is 
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the 
rest of the country.  
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), cited in Harmelin, 501 
U.S. at 1008 (plurality opinion).
252
 Elaborating this point, Professor Calabresi argues that federalism "helps ensure a more informed 
weighing of costs and benefits than often occurs on the national level where taxpayers often may be less 
cognizant of the social costs of particular legislation," and that "competition among jurisdictions creates 
incentives for each jurisdiction to provide bundles of goods that will maximize utility for a majority of the 
voters in that jurisdiction.  Calabresi, supra note 249, at 777.
253 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 988 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
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A rejection of Ewing and Harmelin would eliminate many of these potential 
benefits.  The principal dissenting opinion in Ewing, by Justice Breyer,254 contemplates
significant intrusion by federal judges on the formulation of state penal codes.  Justice 
Breyer estimated at one point in his opinoin that Ewing's sentence was at least "2 to 3 
times the length of sentences that other jurisdictions would impose in similar 
circumstances," and offered this as a basis for viewing the sentence as likely 
unconstitutional.255    Yet Justice Breyer then acknowledged in an appendix to his opinion 
that at least five states authorized punishments equal to or greater than Ewing's in similar 
circumstances.256   The prospect of the dissenters' Eighth Amendment regime is sobering.  
Under it, a state, indeed a sizable group of different states, apparently would not be 
permitted to vary more than two to three times from the choices of the rest of the country 
in fixing a punishment for a given offense.  Adopting Justice Breyer's Ewing dissent 
would thus impose real costs to federalism; it would portend a considerable loss of 
flexibility and independence among the criminal justice systems of the states.257
254
 Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer's dissent.  
255 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 52 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
256 Id. at 59-61 (appendix to dissenting opinion of Breyer, J.) (noting that, at a minimum, the laws of 
Michigan, Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma, and South Dakota would authorize a life sentence — technically, 
in Montana's case, a 100-year sentence — with a time before parole eligibility equal to or greater than 
Ewing's, in circumstances similar to Ewing's crime).
257 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 989-90 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (citations omitted):
That a State is entitled to treat with stern disapproval an act that other States punish with the 
mildest of sanctions follows a fortiori from the undoubted fact that a State may criminalize an act 
that other States do not criminalize at all. Indeed, a State may criminalize an act that other States 
choose to reward -- punishing, for example, the killing of endangered wild animals for which other 
States are offering a bounty. What greater disproportion could there be than that? . . . Diversity not 
only in policy, but in the means of implementing policy, is the very raison d'etre of our federal 
system. Though the different needs and concerns of other States may induce them to treat 
[Harmelin's crime of simple possession of 672 grams of cocaine as a relatively minor offense, . . . 
nothing in the Constitution requires Michigan to follow suit. 
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IV. RECONCILING RATIONALITY REVIEW OF PRISON SENTENCING 
WITH CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF OTHER TYPES OF 
SANCTIONS
The Supreme Court's decisions in the broad area of constitutionality 
proportionality review have encompassed criminal and civil sanctions ranging from
capital punishment to prison terms, prison conditions, fines, and punitive damages.  
These disparate cases do not all reflect a single overarching standard , and I do not claim 
that any amount of interpretive adjustment can make them all perfectly cons istent.  
However, there are a number of important points of congruence among the cases.  A 
stable body of doctrine can be articulated in which prison terms, and most other forms of 
state sanction, are reviewed for rationality, as argued in this Article.
A. Conditions of Confinement
The Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment law on the legality of prison conditions 
employs the same rationality standard applicable to terms of imprisonment.  Conditions 
of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment if they "involve the unnecessary and 
wanton infliction of pain"258 and are "totally without penological justification,"259
virtually indistinguishable from the standard of Harmelin and Ewing.260  Furthermore, the 
test used in the prison conditions cases has a subjective component like that found in the 
sentencing cases.  Courts pay attention to the subjective motivations that produced a 
given condition as well as the sheer harshness of the condition.  Prison conditions violate 
258
 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981).
259 Id.; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
260 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 29 (plurality opinion) (upholding Ewing's sentence because it furthered a "legitimate 
penological goal"); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999, 1004 (plurality opinion).
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the Eighth Amendment only if the decision makers have a "culpable state of mind" 
suggesting "deliberate indifference."261
This is an important source of consistency in the case law.  The prison sentencing 
cases plus the prison conditions cases means that a single, broad constitutional standard 
of rationality governs all application of state sanctions against those duly convicted of an 
offense punishable by imprisonment.  Neither the length of sentence nor the conditions in 
which the sentence is served may be the result of an arbitrary, capricious, or vindictive 
exercise of discretion by a state decisionmaker. 
B. Punitive Damages
To many the most objectionable source of inconsistency in the Court's 
jurisprudence arises from its recent decisions striking down high punitive damages 
awards as violative of the Due Process Clause, even as Eighth Amendment decisions like 
Ewing and Harmelin allow tough prison sentences to stand.  In the past decade, in the 
State Farm262 and Gore263 cases, a majority of the Supreme Court has begun to invalidate 
large punitive damages awards in state court on the ground that they are "grossly 
excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor" and thereby violate the due process 
clause.264
Gore invalidated an Alabama jury's award of $2 million in punitive damages and 
$4,000 in actual damages against BMW for a nationwide practice of selling new cars 
261
 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297, 303 (1991).
262
 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
263
 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
264 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416; Gore, 517 U.S. at 562.
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without disclosing that they had been repainted.265  More recently, State Farm invalidated 
a Utah jury's award of $145 million in punitive damages and $1 million in actual 
damages against State Farm for a variety of torts premised on the insurance company's 
bad faith failure to settle a wrongful death and tort action against the Campbells within 
the policy limits.266  The plaintiffs presented evidence of a variety of actions by State 
Farm in the Campbells' case, and across the nation, that suggested a strong degree of bad 
faith by the insurer.267  However, the Supreme Court held the punitive damages award 
unconstitutional, and suggested sweeping substantive limits on the magnitude of punitive 
damage awards.  The majority "decline[d] . . . to impose a bright-line ratio," but stated in 
a remarkable passage that "in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between 
punitive and compensatory damages, to a signficant degree, will satisfy due process."268
265 Id. at 562-64.
266 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 412-16, 419 ("Under the principles outlined in . . . Gore, this case is neither 
close nor difficult.").
267
 The salient facts were disclosed in part in the majority's opinion, and more fully in Justice Ginsburg's 
dissenting opinion.  The plaintiffs presented evidence that State Farm's own investigation concluded that 
Mr. Campbell was at fault for the lethal car crash that led to the tort claims against him.  The company's 
claims adjuster originally reported that the cost to settle the case would likely be high, but his superiors 
ordered him to alter that portion of his report.  Id. at 433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  A manager also 
instructed the claims adjuster to insert false material in his report impugning the character of the accident 
victim.  Id. at 432.  The company contested liability at trial and refused offers to settle for the policy limits 
of $50,000.  Id. at 413 (majority opinion).  However, the jury found against Campbell and entered a verdict 
for $185, 849.  State Farm refused to fund an appeal and at first refused to cover the excess liability.  Its 
counsel suggested that Campbell "put for sale signs on [his] property to get things moving."  Id.  There was 
evidence that State Farm had implemented a company-wide plan in Utah, and across the nation, to deny 
benefits properly owed to customers in order to meet internal profit targets.  Id. at 431-32 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting).  Employees were instructed to target "the weakest of the herd" in choosing which customers to 
deny benefits.  Id. at 433.  Finally, evidence suggested that the company destroyed incriminating 
documents that would have demonstrated its policies of denying coverage in bad faith.  Id. at 434-35.
268 Id. at 425.
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Indeed, the Court opined that the Campbells' case "likely would justify a punitive 
damages award at or near the amount of compensatory damages."269
Such sweeping language is hard to reconcile with the Court's careful approach to 
due process-style review of prison terms in the Ewing-Harmelin sequence of cases.  
Academic condemnation of the Court's twin handling of the cases has been practically 
universal.270  Something, the commentators agree, has to give.  
The commentators' concerns are reasonable, yet the conflict between the two 
strands of case law is not as sharp as is generally assumed.  A closer appraisal of State 
Farm and Gore discloses that their holdings (though not all of their language) can in fact 
be reconciled with the holdings in the prison sentencing cases, and the general standards 
of due process review.  
In both State Farm and Gore, the victorious plaintiffs offered evidence of the 
defendant's alleged wrongdoing in other states as a basis for a large award of punitive 
damages in the forum state.271  Yet neither set of plaintiffs made any showing that the 
conduct introduced into evidence was unlawful in the states where it had occurred.  The 
269 Id. at 429.
270 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, supra note 18, at 1062-63; Brennan, Note, 
supra note 13, at 552 (calling on Supreme Court to "assert a more active role" in reviewing prison 
sentences); Van Cleave, supra note 13, at 219-220 ("The Supreme Court . . . continue[s] to give teeth to 
proportionality review of . . . monetary punishments. . . . Yet, ironically, the Court has not shown the same 
concern about excessiveness and disproportionality when the punishment is imprisonment, a deprivation of 
liberty. . . . [T]he Court should give terms of imprisonment at least the same level of scrutiny used to 
evaluate punitive damages awards and forfeitures for proportionality."); Gershowitz, supra note 13, 
(criticizing the Supreme Court's respective approaches to prison sentencing and punitive damages as not 
only inconsistent but "backwards").
271 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 414-15 (noting that trial court had denied motion in limine to exclude evidence 
of out of state acts); id. at 420 ("This case . . . was used as a platform to expose, and punish, the perceived 
deficiencies of State Farm's operations throughout the country."); Gore, 517 U.S. at 571-74.  "Alabama 
does not have the power . . . to punish BMW for conduct that was lawful where it occurred and that had no 
impact on Alabama or its residents."  Id. at 572-73.
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Supreme Court plausibly viewed this as an infringement of constitutional prohibitions
against extraterritorial application of a state's laws.272  It also suggested that the use of the 
out-of-state evidence and argument violated principles of fair notice to defendants.273  (In 
contrast to the ongoing controversy over "substantive" due process, the procedural 
requirement of fair notice is one of the least controversial aspects of review under the due 
process clause.)
Two factors tend to justify the judicial interventions in State Farm and Gore.  
Punitive damages awards are typically imposed by jurors who must select a number from 
within a wide, if not unbounded, discretionary range.  In this respect, they present a 
greater danger of arbitrary behavior than do mandatory penalties: they resemble the 
Solem paradigm rather than the Harmelin paradigm.  In addition, State Farm and Gore 
are cases about extraterritoriality as well as excessiveness. than inflexible substantive 
limits on the magnitude of punitive damages.  One may test this proposition by imagining 
a case involving the same outrageous misconduct by the defendant as State Farm, but 
where, contrary to the actual facts, the plaintiff's argument and evidence were strictly 
limited to acts of misconduct within the state rendering the punitive damages judgment, 
thus eliminating or greatly reducing the extraterritoriality and notice concerns that 
informed the Supreme Court's holding.  This reimagined version of State Farm would run 
272 State Farm invoked authority stating a general constitutional principle against extraterritoriality, see 538 
U.S. at 420-22, citing, inter alia, New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161 (1914) ("It would be 
impossible to permit the statutes of Missouri to operate beyond the jurisdiction of that State.").  Gore drew 
more specifically upon cases decided under the so-called Dormant Commerce Clause.  See 517 U.S. at 571-
72 ("[O]ne State's power to impose burdens on the interstate market . . . is not only subordinate to the 
federal power over interstate commerce . . . but is also constrained by the need to respect the interests of 
other States"), citing, inter alia, Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982).
273 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 417 ("[E]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional 
jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to 
punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose."), quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 
574 (Breyer, J., concurring).
70
roughly parallel to Harmelin: i.e., a concededly serious wrongful act that the state 
punishes with a severe sanction, a life sentence without parole in Harmelin, a $145 
million punitive award in State Farm.  The parallel still would not be perfect, because the 
penalty in State Farm would still be the result of a broad discretionary judgment by the 
jury and trial judge (similar to Solem), which should properly receive more due process 
scrutiny that a general legislative judgment like the mandatory sentence in Harmelin.  
Nevertheless, in the reimagined State Farm, the sanction imposed by the jury would 
reflect a rational moral judgment, furthering the legitimate interests of deterring and 
punishing State Farm's conduct in Utah, and it would be difficult to call a $145 million 
award arbitrary or capricious in light of the facts.  In such a case, the "single digit" 
guideline suggested by the majority in State Farm should not control.274  It should give 
way to the more flexible requirement of rationality in Ewing and Harmelin, and the jury's 
judgment should stand. 
C. Fines
Fines imposed as criminal punishment present issues similar to punitive damages. 
However, proportionality analysis of fines involves a different textual provision of the 
Constitution than either punitive damages (which are reviewed under the due process 
clause) or other criminal sanctions (which are reviewed under the prohibition of "cruel 
and unusual punishments," in conformity with Fourteenth Amendment due process 
274
 Judge Posner has taken a related view of State Farm in Matthias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc., 347 
F.3d 672, 677-78 (7th Cir. 2003), which upheld, against a due process challenge, a jury's award of 
$186,000 punitive damages and $5,000 compensatory damages against a hotel chain that "outrageous[ly]" 
tricked guests into renting rooms that it knew were infested with painful bedbugs.  Id. at 678.  Judge Posner 
reasoned that, in light of the low level of compensable harm, the punitive damages award "serve[d] the . . . 
purpose of limiting the defendant's ability to profit from its fraud by escaping detection and (private) 
prosecution."  Id. State Farm and its predecessors, in Judge Posner's view, require judges to police "a 
range, not a point" in evaluating awards of punitive damages.  Id. at 678.
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requirements).  By the terms of the Eighth Amendment, fines need not be "cruel and 
unusual" to be unconstitutional; they need only be "excessive."275 It is reasonable, in the 
face of such language, for courts to review fines for substantive disproportionality , while 
reviewing other common punishments only for arbitrariness, as in Ewing, Harmelin, and 
the prison conditions cases.276
The Supreme Court's principal case on the Excessive Fines Clause coheres with 
such an analysis.  United States v. Bajakajian277 invalidated the application of a federal 
statute that would have required the defendant to forfeit $357,144 as a penalty for 
attempting to move it out of the country without obeying federal reporting 
requirements.278  A five-Justice majority, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, held that the 
forfeiture was "grossly disproportionate" to Bajakajian's offense and violated the Eighth 
Amendment.279 In gauging the appropriateness of the fine, the Bajakajian majority used
the full-blooded proportionality analysis originally deployed in the prison sentencing 
context in Solem v. Helm, including Solem's use of mandatory inter- and 
intrajurisdictional comparisons.280
275 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed . . . ").
276 Cf. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 989-90 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (arguing that it was reasonable of the Framers to 
prohibit excessiveness in bail and fines, which are "sources of revenue" to the State, but not in other modes 
of punishment); See Claus, supra note 147, at 120 (noting the apparent significance of the distinction 
between "excessive" and "cruel and unusual").
277
 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
278 Id. at 324-26; see 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (1994); 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A) (1994).
279 See id. at 336-37.
280 Id. at 339.  The majority gave weight to the fact that under the federal sentencing guidelines, the 
maximum conventional fine for Bajakajian's offense was a mere $5,000.
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As Pamela Karlan has observed, the analysis in Bajakajian also followed Solem 
by focusing its analysis on the factor of retribution: the inherent wrongness of the 
offense, compared to the magnitude of the fine. The Court did not engage in the looser 
textured, Ewing-Harmelin brand of rationality review, under which many different penal 
interests may be considered simultaneously, and a combination of deterrence and 
incapacitation can justify a sanction that would not be justifiable in light of strictly 
retributive considerations.281
Bajakajian's use of Solem's disproportionality standard admittedly creates a tangle 
in the case law.  Why is the excessive fines inquiry to be governed by a standard that the 
Court had first formulated in the context of prison sentencing and then rejected (in 
Harmelin, seven years before Bajakajian) as overbroad?  To resolve this tangle, there is 
no choice but textualism.  The test put forth in Solem was a plausible version of what the 
Eighth Amendment would require if it prohibited "excessive" prison sentences, which it 
does not.282 It was therefore reasonable for the Bajakajian Court to export Solem's 
excessiveness inquiry into a context where the constitution really does prohibit 
"excessiveness" — fines — even though the Court was also correct to scale back Solem
in its original context of prison sentences, where review is only authorized for 
arbitrariness. 
281 See id. at 339; Karlan, supra note 175, at 900-01 ("Ironically, Bajakajian seems to revive, for cases 
where the criminal punishment is a fine, the very sort of inquiry that the Harmelin and Ewing Courts 
rejected with respect to cases where the . . . punishment is a prison sentence. . . . The Court seems to 
analyze the gravity of Bajakajian's offense solely from a retributivist perspective.").
282 Pace, again, recent Court dicta such as Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311.
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D. Capital Punishment
The candid interpreter must acknowledge the existence of at least one irreducible 
division in the proportionality case law: the one separating capital punishment from all 
other sanctions.  Death penalty cases have imposed a host of demanding requirements 
intended to ensure proportionality between the punishment and the crime.283  Under 
current Eighth Amendment law, the death penalty is constitutionally prohibited for non-
aggravated murder,284 felony murder absent an intent to kill,285 and rape286; it cannot be 
imposed on the mildly retarded287 or those under age 18 at the time of their offense288; it 
cannot be imposed as a mandatory penalty289; and sentencing juries or judges must be 
empowered to take all relevant mitigating evidence into account.290  These requirements 
go far beyond the limited scrutiny employed in the prison sentencing cases, and indeed 
beyond the punitive damages and fines cases.291
283 See generally Atkins, 536 U.S. at 352-53 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (summarizing previous holdings).
284
 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980).
285
 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).
286
 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
287 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
288
 Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1198 (2005).
289 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion).
290 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
291 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 995 (opinion of Scalia, J.) ("Our cases creating and clarifying the 
'individualized capital sentencing doctrine' have repeatedly suggested that there is no comparable 
requirement outside the capital context, because of the qualitative difference between death and all other 
penalties."); id. at 997 (plurality opinion) (the "most extensive application" of the proportionality principle 
"has been in death penalty cases"); Dressler, supra note 111, at § 6.05[C], p. 49 (contrasting Court's limited 
"oversight of non-capital sentences" with death penalty cases).
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To be sure, the kind of rationality review exemplified by the Ewing-Harmelin line 
of cases (what might be called, following the argument of this Article, the "due process" 
aspect of the Eighth Amendment) has also sometimes influenced the Justices.  It was 
precisely the impression of overwhelming arbitrariness in the imposition of death that 
appears to have motivated Justice Douglas to concur in the judgment in Furman v. 
Georgia, invalidating existing capital punishment statutes:
There is evidence that the provision of the English Bill of Rights of 1689, from 
which the language of the Eighth Amendment was taken, was concerned 
primarily with selective or irregular application of harsh penalties and that its aim 
was to forbid arbitrary and discriminatory penalties of a severe nature. . . . 
[W]e deal with a system of law and of justice that leaves to the uncontrolled 
discretion of judges or juries the determination whether defendants committing 
these crimes should die or be imprisoned.292
Nevertheless, the Court's death penalty jurisprudence goes far beyond 
arbitrariness review.  It imposes squarely substantive judgments of proportionality in 
cases subject to reasonable moral disagreement.293
Explanation of the Court's "death is different"294 jurisprudence must likewise be 
normative and substantive.  True, the framers of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
292
 408 U.S. 238, 242, 253 (Douglas, J., concurring); see Claus, supra note 147, at 121 (examining Justice 
Douglas's interpretation).
293
 In Roper, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibited the sentence of death in all 
cases involving offenders younger than 18 when their crimes were committed.  125 S.Ct. at 1200; see id. at 
1191-92 (asserting that "in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the 
acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.") (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312).  The 
facts of Roper itself indicated just how contestable that judgment was.  The petitioner, Simmons, was 
convicted for a brutal and premeditated murder he committed at age 17.  He talked before the murder about 
his desire to kill someone, and formulated a plan with two confederates.  He assured his friends that they 
could "get away with" the crime because they were minors.  Id. at 1187.  Simmons broke into the victim's 
house, bound her with duct tape, and walked her to a bridge, where they threw her into a river to drown.  Id. 
at 1188.  Simmons later bragged that he had killed the victim "because the bitch seen my face."  Id.
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, condemned the Roper 
majority's "usurpation of the role of moral arbiter" and its "pronounce[ment] that the Eighth Amendment is 
an ever-changing reflection of 'the evolving standards of decency' of our society."  Id. at 1221-22 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting).
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Clause and its English predecessors put emphasis on abuses of "cruel and barbarous" 
bodily methods of punishment, from the trial of Titus Oates forward.295  This gives a 
certain originalist pedigree to the notion that state-imposed death deserves more scrutiny 
than more commonplace and less spectacular sanctions such as imprisonment.  The 
qualitative difference between death and other punishments is mirrored in the qualitative 
difference between Eighth Amendment (and due process) review of death and review of 
other sanctions.  At the same time, the streams of precedent in capital and noncapital 
proportionality review have been so divergent for so long that they no longer exert much 
gravitational pull on one another.  To bring a coherent and justifiable order to the practice 
of constitutional review of noncapital sanctions may be ambition enough. 
V. CONCLUSION
A durable idea about the Fourteenth Amendment, and particularly its due process 
clause, holds that it "add[s] greatly to the dignity and glory of . . . citizenship,"296 by 
acting as a "bulwar[k] against arbitrary legislation."297  As interpreted by Carolene 
Products and its progeny, the due process clause confers a The Eighth Amendment, in its 
application to individual prison sentences, is best understood as extending that same 
principle to the magnitude of individual terms of imprisonment.  This conception is 
normatively defensible on its own terms, and it sheds light on the constitutional review of 
294 See Note, The Rhetoric of Difference and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1599, 1599 (2001) (tentatively identifying the origin of this phrase with a remark by Professor Anthony 
Amsterdam in oral argument in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).
295 See supra text accompanying notes 73 to 78, 139 to 160, describing the history of the Eighth 
Amendment and English Bill of Rights.
296
 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
297
 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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other noncapital sanctions — fines, punitive damages, and conditions of imprisonment.  
It suggests a general principle, implemented through the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, prohibiting the arbitrary and capricious application of state force to the 
individual.
